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BENCHMARKS OF JUSTICE
The New York Times
July 1, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
It was a Supreme Court term that defied labels and
made history.
Perhaps the single most important fact about the term
that ended last Friday after a weeklong torrent of
landmark opinions is how important it was.
In case after case, whether venturing into new areas
or revisiting old disputes, the Justices established new
reference points, frameworks within which not only law
but, to no small degree, social and political
arrangements will now evolve.
In rejecting Congress's effort to regulate speech on the
Internet, the Court delivered, with essential unanimity,
a broadly forward-looking charter for free speech in the
world's newest medium of communication; in terms of
immediate practical consequence, this may have been
the term's most significant decision.
In ruling that there is no general constitutional right
to doctor-assisted suicide, the Court held the door open
to future legislative developments and even, somewhat
surprisingly, to future legal claims on behalf of a right
of terminally ill people to control the timing and the
manner of their death.
In overturning a part of the Brady gun-control law on
the basis of a forcefully expressed, if narrowly
supported, vision of state sovereignty, the Court served
notice that long-settled assumptions about the primacy
of the national government within the Federal system
may no longer be valid.
All this from a Court that preached judicial restraint
even as it overturned four Federal laws, including the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a statute that
passed Congress by near acclamation but that intruded,
according to the Justices, on the power of the Supreme
Court to define not only the minimal boundaries of
constitutional rights but the outer limits as well. (In
addition to the Brady law, the Communications
Decency Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, the fourth law the Court invalidated was the Indian
Land Consolidation Act of 1984, which took small
parcels of land from individual Indians and transferred
them to tribal ownership.)
It was a term about boundaries: between the Federal
Government and the states, in the Brady Act case;
between the judiciary and Congress, in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act case as well as in a decision
rejecting an effort by Congressional plaintiffs to obtain
review of the Line-Item Veto Act; between courts and
legislatures, in the Justices' conclusion in the
assisted-suicide case that courts should step back and let
legislators proceed; between the Presidency and the
courts, in the unanimous rejection of President Clinton's
effort to delay proceedings in a private lawsuit against
him, and between church and state, in the reversal of a
precedent that had kept public-school teachers out of
parochial-school classrooms.
"The Supreme Court is redesigning the basic
institutional architecture of our public lives," said Prof.
Paul Gewirtz of Yale Law School. Even in those
decisions that appear to have a rather abstract quality,
Professor Gewirtz said, "the Court's insistence on
certain structures of power has enormous consequences"
for the allocation of power in the country.
The sweep of the term's decisions did more than
underscore the Supreme Court's essential authority "to
say what the law is," in the words of Marbury v.
Madison, the 1803 decision that established this
authority and that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy referred
to throughout his decision on the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. It was also a reminder of the Court's
ability to galvanize a national conversation, sometimes
merely by selecting a case for decision. While the Court
scarcely created the debate over doctor-assisted suicide,
for example, it was only once the Justices undertook to
decide the issue that a big segment of the public tuned
in for the first time.
In the coming term, the role of lightning-rod case is
very likely to be assumed by an affirmative action
dispute the Court accepted for decision on the final day
of the term. That case is an appeal by a school board in
Piscataway, N.J., from a ruling that the dismissal of a
white teacher in order to protect a black teacher's job
violated Federal civil rights law. It raises the question
of whether diversity alone is ever an acceptable
rationale for race-conscious employment decisions.
The Court's decision to hear the Piscataway case was
a setback for the Clinton Administration, which had
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tried to persuade the Justices not to take the case and
which must now take a stand on a concrete and
politically uninviting dispute just when Mr. Clinton is
trying to initiate a nationwide discussion of race.
This was not a happy Supreme Court term for the
Administration. The Justices not only ruled against Mr.
Clinton in the Paula Jones case but also refused to hear
an appeal on whether White House lawyers' notes were
protected by attorney-client privilege against compelled
disclosure to the Whitewater independent counsel.
The Court's 80 opinions ranged over many corners of
the law, sometimes reflecting a surprising degree of
unanimity. Nearly half the cases, 38, were decided by
9-to-O votes, unanimous in result if not always in
reasoning. Among these were the Internet and
assisted-suicide cases. For the first time in years of
scrutinizing government drug-testing programs, the
Justices finally met one they did not like, striking down
a Georgia program as unconstitutional, with only Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist dissenting.
Seventeen cases were decided by 5-to-4 votes. The
largest number of these, eight cases, were decided by
the same majority bloc: the three most conservative
Justices, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the two Justices in the
middle of the Court, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. The cases included a few of the
term's most important, among them the Brady law
ruling, the decision overturning the precedent on
parochial schools, a redistricting case from Georgia and
a ruling permitting states to commit violent sex
offenders to mental hospitals when their prison terms
have expired.
The Court's liberal bloc, consisting of Justices John
Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer, needed an ally if they were to
accomplish anything. Justice O'Connor joined this
group in a 5-to-4 decision rejecting immunity for
private prison guards. The liberal group splintered
among themselves fairly often this term.
Liberal, in fact, is a relative word with respect to the
current Court. The term was a powerful reminder of the
extent to which the Court's center of gravity has shifted
to the right in recent years.
For example, in the case on the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, not a single Justice argued for a
position that for years was a liberal article of faith: that
when it came to protecting constitutional rights, the
Court could build the floor but Congress had the power
to raise the ceiling. Conservatives derided this theory as
the "one-way ratchet" in constitutional law. In any
event, the point is now moot.
In similar fashion, in the 5-to-4 decision on extended
confinement for sex offenders, no one on the Court
really disputed that the Constitution gave Kansas room
to accomplish its goal; the debate was a much narrower
one of procedure rather than of substance.
And in the assisted-suicide case, the claim that all
Justices rejected -- that the Constitution's due process
guarantee is expansive enough to include a right of
terminally ill people to have a doctor's assistance in
dying -- was hardly fanciful. The appeals court whose
decision the Supreme Court overturned had accepted
that argument by a vote of 8 to 3.
In other words, there is a range of constitutional
discourse that is not being heard on the Court today.
Arguments that not so many years ago would have
flowed comfortably, even if not successfully, from the
mainstream of legal thought now appear as little more
than liberal delusions. By the same token, it would have
been inconceivable to many people only a few years ago
that the states' rights attack on the Brady Act could
have won five votes at the Supreme Court.
This term, which began on Oct. 7 and ended on June
27, was many things. It was, as Robert H. Bork once
famously described his view of life on the Court, an
intellectual feast. In the crowding of so many important
decisions into the final few days, the Justices basically
delivered a whole term in a single week, in a kind of
Supreme Court version of Tom Stoppard's 12-minute
"Hamlet." It was a term that mattered.
Following are summaries of the term's most important
decisions:
Presidential Power
The Court voted 9 to 0 to reject President Clinton's
request for a delay, until he leaves office, in proceedings
of a sexual harassment suit brought against him by a
former Arkansas state employee, Paula Corbin Jones.
The decision, Clinton v. Jones, No. 95-1853, was the
first in which the Court had considered whether an
incumbent President could be sued for actions outside
the scope of his official duties. Justice Stevens wrote the
Court's opinion, and Justice Breyer concurred
separately.
Constitutional Structure
A major focus of the Court's attention, this category
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encompasses cases relating both to federalism -- the
relationship between the state and national governments
-- and to the separation of powers among the three
branches of the Federal Government. In two rulings
overturning two major Federal laws, the Court read the
Constitution as limiting the authority that Congress had
assumed it possessed.
In the first case, City of Boerne v. Flores, No.
95-2074, the Court by 6 to 3 declared unconstitutional
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a law intended
to guarantee religious observance a higher level of
statutory protection than the Court, ruling in a previous
case, had thought constitutionally necessary.
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy said that
while Congress had the power under the 14th
Amendment to remedy or prevent civil rights
violations, it lacked authority to make a substantive
change in the meaning of the Constitution.
Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer dissented.
Significantly, however, they did not dispute the
proposition that Congress cannot expand constitutional
rights.
The Court's second blow to Congressional authority
came in striking down a part of the Brady gun control
law that required local law-enforcement officials to
perform background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers.
Justice Scalia's opinion for a 5-to-4 majority in Printz
v. United States, No. 95-1478, said the provision
violated "the very principle of separate state
sovereignty," which he called "one of the Constitution's
structural protections of liberty." Congress may not
require states to help administer Federal programs, the
Court said. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas, O'Connor and Kennedy joined the opinion.
The Court avoided, but probably only deferred, ruling
on the constitutionality of the Line-Item Veto Act,
which gives the President new authority to cancel parts
of appropriations bills he signs into law. By a vote of 7
to 2, the Court said in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist that the half-dozen members of Congress
who had challenged the new law as a diminution of
their legislative power lacked sufficient concrete injury
to give them legal standing to bring the suit. Justices
Stevens and Breyer dissented in Raines v. Byrd, No.
96-1671.
The Court ruled 5 to 4 that states offering favorable
tax treatment to charities cannot draw distinctions
based on whether a charity serves primarily in-state or
out-of-state clients. The decision, Camps Newfound/
Owatonna v. Harrison, No. 94-1988, struck down a
Maine law that withheld tax-exempt status from
organizations not serving a predominantly local
population, in this case a religious camp with mostly
out-of-state campers. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and
Breyer.
Religion
The Court overruled a 1985 precedent that prohibited
public-school teachers from teaching special federally
financed remedial classes on the premises of parochial
schools. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Agostini v.
Felton, No. 96-552, was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas;
all five had been vocal critics of the earlier ruling,
Aguilar v. Felton. The degree to which the latest
decision opens the door to further government aid to
parochial schools is subject to debate.
Free Speech
In an essentially unanimous opinion, the Court wrote
a charter for free speech in cyberspace by declaring
unconstitutional the Communications Decency Act, a
1996 Federal law that made it a crime to display
"indecent" material on line in a manner that might
make it available to minors. Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, No.
96-511. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented in part.
Voting 5 to 4, the Court awarded a major victory to
the broadcast television industry by upholding a Federal
law that requires cable television systems to carry the
signals of local over-the-air broadcast stations. The
cable industry had challenged the 1992 law as requiring
unconstitutional government-compelled speech. Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion, Turner Broadcasting v.
Federal Communications Commission, No. 95-992,
with the concurrence of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
The Court voted 6 to 3 to uphold a lower court's order
keeping demonstrators at least 15 feet from the
doorways and driveways of several upstate New York
abortion clinics. An anti-abortion group had challenged
the injunction as an infringement on free speech. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network, No. 95-1065. Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas dissented. A separate part of the
decision overturned, over Justice Breyer's solitary
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dissent, an order requiring demonstrators to stay 15 feet
from people entering or leaving the clinics.
In a political-speech case, the Court ruled 6 to 3 that
states were not constitutionally required to permit
candidates to appear on more than one party's ballot
line. The decision, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, No. 95-1608, was a blow to minor parties, which
are barred by nearly all states -- one notable exception
being New York -- from gaining leverage by
cross-endorsing other parties' candidates. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg
and Souter dissented.
The Court narrowly upheld a New Deal-era Federal
marketing law under which growers of various
commodities, in this case certain California fruits, are
required to contribute to generic advertising campaigns.
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros., No. 95-1184, said the law was an
unexceptional form of economic regulation, rather than
compelled speech as some growers had argued and a
lower court found. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Ginsburg and Breyer joined the opinion.
Civil Rights
The Court voted 5 to 4 to uphold a court-ordered
redistricting plan that shrank the number of
majority-black Congressional districts in Georgia from
three to one. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Abrams v.
Johnson, No. 95-1425, said that to create any additional
districts with black majorities would demonstrate an
impermissible consciousness of race. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas
joined the opinion, a forceful reiteration of the
majority's rejection of race-based districting.
Due Process
In perhaps the most closely watched case of the year,
the Court ruled 9 to 0, with a majority opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, that there is no general right to
doctor-assisted suicide under the constitutional
guarantee of due process. But in separate opinions, five
Justices suggested that in a future case, they may find
that terminally ill people in intractable pain have a
more narrowly framed right to a doctor's assistance in
ending their suffering by hastening death.
The decision, Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110,
upheld Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide. In
a companion ruling, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858,
dealing with New York's law, the Court rejected by the
same vote a challenge that was based on the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
A 5-to-4 decision upheld a Kansas law, the Sexually
Violent Predator Act, which permits the state to confine
certain violent sex offenders in mental hospitals after
they have served their criminal sentences. The Kansas
Supreme Court had found the law to violate the
Constitution's due process guarantee. That ruling was
overturned in Kansas v. Hendricks, No. 95-1649.
Justice Thomas wrote the decision and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Scalia.
The Court ruled 6 to 3 that states cannot erect
financial barriers that keep poor people from appealing
judicial decisions terminating their legal relationship
with their children. The decision, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No.
95-853, overturned a ruling by the Mississippi Supreme
Court that refused to allow an appeal by a mother who
could not pay $2,000 for an official trial transcript.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the decision. Justice Thomas,
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Criminal Law
While numerous, criminal cases did not occupy a
particularly prominent place on the Court's docket. In
two decisions, the Court upheld the police in encounters
with people in cars.
The Court ruled unanimously that once the police
have stopped a car for a traffic infraction, they may go
on to request the driver's permission to search for drugs
without first informing him that he is, in fact, free to
decline the search and go on his way. The Ohio
Supreme Court had required the police to provide that
information. The case was Ohio v. Robinette, No.
95-891.
And the Court ruled 7 to 2 that the police may
routinely order passengers out of a car when the driver
has been pulled over for an ordinary traffic violation.
The police need not suspect that the passenger has
committed a crime or presents a danger, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said in Maryland v. Wilson, No. 95-1268.
Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented.
Striking down a government drug-testing program for
the first time, the Court ruled 8 to I that a Georgia law
requiring candidates for public office to be tested and
certified drug-free violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches. Justice
Ginsburg wrote the opinion, Chandler v. Miller, No.
96-126, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
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The Court ruled 5 to 4 that Congress did not intend a
1996 Federal law, which makes it much harder for state
prison inmates to file habeas corpus petitions in Federal
court, to apply retroactively to inmates who already had
petitions pending. Justice Souter wrote the opinion,
Lindh v. Murphy, No. 96-6298, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer.
The Court ruled unanimously in Richards v.
Wisconsin, No. 96-5955, that states may not carve out
a blanket exception for drug searches from the general
Fourth Amendment rule that requires the police to
knock and announce their presence before executing a
search warrant.
Voting 5 to 4, the Court upheld a Virginia man's
death sentence while acknowledging that the 1988
sentencing proceeding was unconstitutional under a
later Supreme Court decision in a separate case. Jurors
in Joseph R. O'Dell's case never learned that if they
rejected the state's request for the death penalty, Mr.
O'Dell would never be released but would instead serve
life in prison without parole. Justice Thomas wrote the
majority opinion in O'Dell v. Netherland, No. 96-6867.
Justice Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.
Liability
The Justices set aside a landmark $1.3 billion
class-action settlement of current and future claims
against former asbestos manufacturers, ruling 6 to 2
that the agreement did not meet Federal requirements
for protecting the legal interests of the diverse group of
plaintiffs. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion in
Amchem Products v. Windsor, No. 96-270. Justices
Breyer and Stevens dissented, and Justice O'Connor did
not participate.
The Court ruled that railroad workers who had been
exposed to asbestos on the job but showed no signs of
illness were not entitled to damages under a Federal
liability law. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion,
Metro-North v. Buckley, No. 96-320. Justices Ginsburg
and Stevens dissented from a part of the ruling.
The Court ruled 5 to 4 that employees of private
companies that run prisons under contract to state and
local governments are not entitled to the partial
immunity from prisoner lawsuits that shields publicly
employed prison guards. Justice Breyer wrote the
opinion in Richardson v. McKnight, No. 96-318, joined
by Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
Environment
The Court unanimously interpreted the Endangered
Species Act to permit lawsuits not only by people who
think the Government is doing too little to protect
endangered species but also by those who think that
Federal regulation has gone too far. The decision,
Bennett v. Spear, No. 95-813, opens the door to suits
against Federal regulators by business interests and
affected property owners.
The Court backed the Federal Government in a
long-running boundary dispute with Alaska. The 6-to-3
ruling, United States v. Alaska, No. 84 Original, had
the effect of extending Federal environmental
protection to coastal areas, deemed under the decision
to be Federal territory, where Alaska had intended to
drill for oil and natural gas. Justice O'Connor wrote the
opinion. Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Securities Law
In the most important securities law ruling in years,
the Court gave a major victory to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in upholding its expansive view
of insider trading. Under the 6-to-3 decision, United
States v. O'Hagan, No. 96-842, a person can be guilty
of insider trading even in the absence of a formal
connection to the company whose stock he is buying.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented.
Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company
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HIGH COURT WRESTLED WITH EMOTIONAL ISSUES
The Washington Post
Sunday, June 29, 1997
Joan Biskupic
One Supreme Court justice went two nights without
sleep. Another, struggling to write his dissenting
opinion last week, repeatedly missed deadlines for
passing a draft around to colleagues. A few stumbled
wearily as they read aloud the court's final rulings from
the bench. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist caught
himself announcing a case with a citation from 1987,
not 1997, corrected himself and sighed.
As the nation's high court justices completed an
exceptional end game rush to finish out the term, they
delivered a series of decisions that, more than any in
recent memory, will have an immediate and dramatic
impact on American lives.
Last week alone, the justices spoke to the desperation
of the terminally ill, the anxieties of parents and
concerns of civil libertarians, struggling with
pornography on the Internet. They addressed claims of
religious bigotry and community fears of sexual
predators. And they laid down new rules for the
interminable tug of war between Washington and the
states over which should address the nation's pressing
social concerns.
This was a term in which the work of nine justices
--individual, fallible, but, collectively, final --
thoroughly intersected with the lives of Americans. As
Rehnquist wrote in the pair of assisted-suicide cases
before the court, a profound national debate is
underway over the moral and legal rules for people
facing death. "Because of advances in medicine and
technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to
die in institutions, from chronic illnesses." This came
from a man whose wife, Natalie, died in 1991 after a
painful battle with cancer.
In an era when the federal government works in
quarter-turn screws -- incrementally and often without
obvious consequence -- this court moved with bold
decisiveness in setting bench marks for the next
century. It was not just another term affirming previous
rulings on abortion protests (though there was that) or
interpreting established anti-discrimination statutes
(there was that too). This was a watershed term for
entering arenas, cyberspace and assisted suicide, into
which the high court had never been.
Stanford University law professor Gerald Gunther
characterized the term as one of great social and
constitutional moment. "The cases showed the
mythology of the court, large in American life, and the
actuality of the court as a defender of the Constitution,"
he said.
It is a court, however, that does not fit easily under an
ideological label. Though sometimes tagged political
conservatives -- because most of those who serve on it
were appointed by Republicans -- the abiding principle
is a federalist one, that Congress should stay out of the
business of the states.
Indicative of the difficulty of the issues in this
October-to-June term, nearly every big case -- even
some that were argued last fall -- was decided in the
past 10 days. And not with ease. In any term, there is
a last-minute rush when the justices are circulating
draft opinions and trying to corral votes on their side.
But there is a deep 5 to 4 rift on the court that appeared
often this term. In the final days on these highly
emotional cases, justices on each side often jockey to
more powerfully state their case.
The five who most consistently stand together are
Rehnquist and justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
This bloc has only gotten stronger in recent years.
Kennedy and O'Connor sometimes swing over to more
liberal positions but there was an unusual cohesiveness
this term among the five.
The signature of this group is an effort to strengthen
state sovereignty and diminish the reach of federal
authority.
On social issues, the court is harder to typecast. Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, for example,
were in their traditional roles standing apart from the
Rehnquist five in a decision permitting public
schoolteachers to provide remedial help to students at
parochial schools. (The majority said it did not violate
constitutional separation of church and state.) But in a
separate case both endorsed a standard that makes it
easier for governments to interfere with religious
practices in some cases and said Congress had gone too
far in passing a religious freedom bill.
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In that case, City of Boerne v. Flores, O'Connor ended
up dissenting with particular passion, saying the court
had harmed religious liberty: "Our nation's founders
conceived of a republic receptive to voluntary religious
expression, not of a secular society in which religious
expression is tolerated only when it does not conflict
with a generally applicable law." The majority struck
down a statute that would have allowed governments to
infringe on religious practices only if they have a
health, safety or other "compelling interest" in doing
so.
In the two right-to-assisted-suicide cases, perhaps the
most watched of the term, the court was unanimous
that there is no general right embedded within the
Constitution that ensures patients near death that they
can seek a doctor's help in ending their lives. But the
justices splintered on their reasoning and five
suggested that a case might eventually come to the
court in which an individual's suffering might be so
great that a constitutional right in an individual dire
case might arise. Like Rehnquist, many of the justices
know intimately the toll of cancer. Ginsburg's mother
died of cancer right before Ginsburg's high school
graduation. O'Connor has been successfully treated for
breast cancer and Stevens has recovered from prostate
cancer.
In the Internet case, handed down on the same day as
the assisted-suicide rulings, the justices decided that a
broadly written law to keep indecent materials off the
Internet intruded on the free speech rights of adults. In
trying to deny minors access to pornography, Stevens
said the law effectively suppressed the free speech
rights of adults. "[Tihe level of discourse reaching a
mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would
be suitable for a sandbox."
To prepare for their first case relating to cyberspace,
the justices signed onto the Internet, some for the first
time. In a place where old-fashioned is the fashion, this
was itself remarkable; the court gives away quill pens
as souvenirs and some of the justices still write draft
opinions in longhand.
The Internet case also shows how the usual rules of
politics die at the court's door. While Congress and
President Clinton enthusiastically signed onto
legislation banning pornography on the Internet, partly
in the name of family values, even the two justices
most often associated with the ideological right --
Scalia and Thomas -- did not hesitate to reject
legislation that tread on free speech.
So much of the court's work is shrouded in secrecy
that it is difficult to truly know what the justices were
thinking -- beyond the final words of their opinions -
or how much those rulings changed in the final days.
Lights in some chambers were on well past midnight.
Court printers and other personnel stayed on call round
the clock. Until Friday, when the court finally delivered
its last decree, the staff did not know when the end
would come. Rehnquist had hoped to hand down the
last ruling by Thursday. But last-minute judicial
haggling on the Brady Act case precluded that.
Dissenting justices Stevens and David H. Souter
sparred behind the scenes with Scalia, who wrote the
majority.
By the time that ruling, striking down a key part of a
handgun control law, was announced on Friday
morning, two of the court's black leather chairs were
empty. Rehnquist and O'Connor already had left town.
Rehnquist had put great pressure on his colleagues to
finish up last week and not trail, as is occasionally the
case, into the first few days of July. Mere discipline
may partly have been his message, but he also had
tickets today for Rome.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Co.
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SUPREME COURT TERM: A SHOWCASE OF POWER
MAJOR RULINGS INDICATE NEW SENSE OF MISSION
USA Today
Monday, June 30, 1997
Tony Mauro
Throughout its headline-making decisions last week, the Supreme Court was engaged
in a less dramatic but profoundly important mission.
The court, more assertively than it has in decades, assumed the role of constitutional
border patrol, policing the boundaries between the three branches of government as well
as between the federal and state governments.
The court, proclaiming its primacy in deciding what the Constitution means, scolded
Congress for infringing on state powers in the Brady handgun law, for enforcing religious
freedom in ways that usurped the power of the courts and the states and for restricting
the Internet in a law that violates the First Amendment.
Presidential power also was reined in when the justices told President Clinton he had
no special immunity from facing Paula Jones' sexual harassment lawsuit while in office.
And in areas ranging from the imprisonment of sexual predators to the thorny issue of
physician-assisted suicide, the court said states could experiment without the heavy hand
of federal power. The Brady Law decision also could embolden states to resist a range of
federal fiats.
The redrawing of constitutional boundary lines reflects the conservative vision of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, who celebrated his 25th year on the court Jan. 7
States -- once viewed as havens of racism and stingy spending on social and educational
programs -- gain power and respect, at the expense of Congress and the president.
"Rehnquist finally has five solid votes for a strong defense of state powers," says David
O'Brien of the University of Virginia.
Rehnquist's allies: Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. Those five formed the majority that struck down portions of the Brady Law last
Friday in a detailed, 37-page states' rights manifesto written by Scalia.
They also joined, along with other justices, in striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, in which Congress tried to force courts and the states to give greater
deference to religious practices when enforcing general laws.
"The Constitution is preserved best when each part of the government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of other branches," Kennedy said
in the religion case. When Congress exceeds its authority, Kennedy added, "this court's
precedent, not (Congress), must control."
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"After several years of feeling its way, the court's personality is now clearly emerging,"
Steve Shapiro, national legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, says. "The
court is more skeptical of federal authority than any court in recent history."
To justify the court's stance, its conservative members filled dozens of pages in the
court's decisions with a historical investigation of the intent of the Constitution's framers.
"It's unusual to see so many cases invoking history," University of Virginia law professor
A.E. Howard says.
But Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter fought back with their own versions of
history. Stevens, 76, was rumored to be considering retirement this term but seems to be
drawing new strength from his role as defender of a more generous view of federal power.
He read from his dissent in the Brady Law case for more than 20 minutes on Friday.
A retirement by one of the conservative justices could make the shift back to state power
fleeting. While it lasts, its impact will be uncertain. It comes at a time when, in areas such
as welfare, Congress and the president are returning power to the states anyway. But
Congress is unlikely to willingly give up what many of its leaders view as its prerogatives
to pass laws on a wide range of subjects.
On one area of the law, the high court last term seemed more united: freedom of speech.
The justices embraced the Internet as a new medium protected by the First Amendment,
rejecting congressional efforts to restrict indecent material from sites accessible to minors.
Even the two dissenting justices accorded the Internet First Amendment respect, though
they believed Congress could legislate an "adult zone" in cyberspace.
"The content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought," Stevens wrote for the
majority. "Our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny
that should be applied to this medium."
After recessing on Friday, the justices head off for vacations and summer teaching stints
abroad. Rehnquist will teach in Italy, while Kennedy and Stephen Breyer head for Austria
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg travels for France and England.
So far, the cases already docketed for the fall term seem less dramatic than the one just
concluded, with one exception: an affirmative action case that could further erode, if not
end, the use of that method for aiding minorities in the workplace.
USA Today Copyright 1997
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DIVIDED WE STAND
WHEN JUSTICES DIDN'T AGREE THIS PAST TERM,
THEY REALLY, REALLY DIDN'T AGREE
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Sunday, July 20, 1997
Stewart M. Jay
Every year the ritual is repeated. Toward the end of
June the U.S. Supreme Court issues the legal
equivalent of an avalanche. Instead of rocks, the
cascade consists of hundreds of pages of dense prose
to explain the court's decisions in a score of cases.
Often the court reserves its most difficult and
controversial rulings for release in the closing days of
its term. In some years, such as the one just
completed by the justices, the holdings and their
rationales can have far-reaching effects on the
structure of our government and the rights of the
people.
Some 80 decisions were rendered by the court since
October. The result of this collective effort was a
wide-ranging series of holdings touching on most
every aspect of the Constitution. In addition, the
court resolved a number of important issues
concerning statutory and administrative law.
Examining the work of the court during this latest
term, we find a number of trends.
One development is the unanimity of the court on
almost half the cases. However, in the close cases, the
voting pattern revealed deep ideological divisions.
In the 5-4 decisions that resolved some of the most
contentious cases, there was a predictable camp of
"liberal" justices (Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter)
opposing the "conservatives" (Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas). Two others - O'Connor and Kennedy - held
the decisive votes, swinging between the two camps,
albeit more often toward the right.
These labels (like their counterparts "activist" and
"strict constructionist") tend to be crude
generalizations. At the very least they are poor
substitutes for a close examination of the issues
involved.
Due Process of Law at Life's End
Most Americans would agree that they have a
constitutional right to be left alone by the state in
making highly personal decisions, such as the sort of
medical care they accept. Even so, there scarcely
exists consensus on the question of whether a dying
person should have the right to a physician's
affirmative assistance in hastening death. This last
term of the court stirred the debate as the justices
grappled with the controversial issue of whether the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment afforded
such a right.
In a case arising from a challenge to Washington
state's flat ban on the practice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion posed the issue in a
tellingly different way, namely whether the
Constitution included "a right to commit suicide with
another's assistance." Clearly not, Rehnquist and his
concurring associates concluded, for "a consistent
and almost universal tradition has long rejected the
asserted right" In a companion case from New York,
Rehnquist also wrote for the court in rejecting a
challenge to such laws based on the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment.
At the same time, five of the concurring members of
the court pointedly noted that the decision did not
resolve all the issues that could arise in the terminal
stage of life. Justice Breyer thought that the ultimate
issue was not a right to "assisted suicide," but rather
a "right to die with dignity." For Justice Stevens and
several others, a far different case would be presented
if a state forced a dying person to suffer unrelievable
and intolerable pain. None of the justices believed
that the statutes under review required such a result.
In the end, it was the practical details surrounding
death that caused most of the justices to balk.
Recognizing a broad right to 'assisted suicide" might
eviscerate the government's ability to protect patients
from such dangers as coercion by family members
eager to cut off medical bills. Some justices worried
about how they might contain such a right from
expanding to a judicially ordered version of
euthanasia as practiced in Holland. These were
complex issues, the court concluded, that were best
left to state legislative processes.
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While resolving the cases before it, the court's
rationale left the underlying law under the due
process clause in confusion. Rehnquist did not even
bother to offer a convincing distinction from Roe v.
Wade, undoubtedly because he has invariably
dissented in abortion cases and has been an
unrelenting opponent of the court declaring
fundamental rights. In both abortion and the "right to
die" cases, there is a collision between state's interest
in protecting life and the individual's stake in bodily
integrity and personal autonomy. And just as there is
no long tradition of legalized "assisted suicide," so
too prior to Roe restrictions on abortion were
longstanding.
Roe recognized how technology can change the
constitutional calculus. Advances in medicine have
made most abortions safer than childbirth; likewise,
the ability to keep people alive in agonizing
humiliation was not possible until very recently.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to look for a lengthy
tradition of acceptance to decide whether a specific
practice should be constitutionally protected.
Roe was clear that the woman's right to control her
reproduction overrode the state's interest in
protecting potential life through an absolute ban on
abortion. Moreover, as Justice Souter said in these
"right to die" cases, granting the liberty of abortion
without an accompanying right of physician
assistance would "too often amount to nothing more
than a right to self-mutilation." Similarly, if the
terminally ill must affect their own deaths, "the
patient's right will often be confined to crude
methods of causing death, most shocking and painful
to the decedent's survivors."
In all of the instances in which the court has found
fundamental rights in the silence of the Constitution,
a plausible argument can be made that resolution
should be left to political processes over which the
electorate has final control. Still, since the beginning
of the Republic Americans have recognized that the
people do not want their most precious liberties left
in the hands of legislatures beholden to special
interests or headline- seeking politicians. Heeding
that concern, the court has used the due process
clause as a vehicle for recognizing the liberty to
marry, to have children and control their upbringing,
to travel, to reside together as a family, and to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. Few would disagree
with these holdings.
What the court should have done was to put the
states on notice that there is a point at which the
individual's right to control the last chapter of her life
must prevail. Certainly that would leave the bulk of
the work to legislatures, while at the same time
offering hope that a dying person's last days will not
be spent in litigation.
Confining Sexual Predators
Ending several years of intense debate, the court
upheld a Kansas law (modeled after Washington's)
authorizing the indefinite civil commitment of sexual
predators who already had served their sentences. All
of the justices agreed that a properly constructed law
of this sort was constitutional - in principle sexual
offenders had no better claim to walk the streets than
a person who was a danger to society because of other
mental abnormalities.
Justice Thomas' opinion for the majority
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined)
turned aside the dissenting view that such
confinement must be accompanied by appropriate
treatment, assuming such was available. Thomas and
his colleagues would go no further than to require
Kansas to "recommend treatment."
This is unacceptable in a free society. As despicable
as the defendant was in this case, he had served the
sentence mandated by law. If he can now be locked
up forever without receiving treatment, it is hard to
see why this does not constitute double jeopardy.
Congressional Powers
Oddly enough, the same justices who have been
reluctant to read unwritten rights into the
Constitution are more than willing to find that it
contains implicit limitations on the power of
Congress. In one case this term the court struck down
part of the Brady Act because it "commandeered"
local law enforcement officials into checking the
backgrounds of handgun buyers.
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Scalia (joined
by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas) saw
the modest duties imposed on local officials as a
peculiar threat to the independence of the states.
Since the Constitution itself contains no such explicit
bar on Congress, Justice Scalia turned to the history
and structure of the Constitution for guidance.
Suffice it to say that the dissenters returned the fire
with a competing account of what the Framers of the
Constitution intended in this regard.
Scalia's concern seems misplaced given that for the
past 60 years the court has validated far more
powerful means by which Congress can dominate the
states. Not the least of these is the erection of a
federal bureaucracy to administer programs like the
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Brady Act - staffed by officials far less accountable to
the people than local authorities.
On the whole, the court's philosophy for more than
50 years has been to rely on congressional
delegations to protect state interests in the national
political processes. The Brady Act hardly snuck into
the statute books under cover of darkness, as years of
ferocious partisan warfare preceded its adoption.
Surely it is peculiar that the court has sanctioned the
vast modern expansion of the federal government,
which has soaked up the tax revenues needed by the
states to accomplish their own ends, yet it balks at
allowing a relatively minor obligation to be imposed
on state officials. Or that court has permitted
Congress to pass countless laws that must be enforced
at great expense by state and local judiciaries.
The justices also showed impatience with
congressional overreaching by striking the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding Congress'
powers under the 14th Amendment. Passed with near
unanimity by Congress in 1993, this statute was
intended to nullify a landmark ruling by the court on
the scope of First Amendment religious freedoms. In
that earlier decision, Employment Division v. Smith,
the court held that the free exercise clause did not
relieve a person from complying with a law generally
applicable to the populace merely because it
interfered with religious practices.
Thus a member of the Native American Church
could not object to penalties imposed for peyote use,
notwithstanding that ingestion of the drug was a
sacrament in the religion. Or, in the case before the
court this term, a city in Texas could insist that the
Roman Catholic parish comply with historic
preservation ordinances preventing enlargement of
its church.
Congress preferred the approach taken by the court
in cases prior to Smith, which required government
to give a strong justification for laws burdening
religion. Consistent with the cases before Smith, the
1993 legislation demanded that government prove
that such a law was essential to accomplishing a
compelling governmental purpose.
In short, the justices informed Congress that it had
no business disagreeing with the court's
interpretation of the Constitution. Yes, Congress
could assist in enforcing the 14$ Amendment by
passing laws to deter or remedy violations. It was
quite another thing for Congress to change the
substance of a constitutional right. Doing so violated
the justices' long-claimed privilege of having the
final word on constitutional meaning.
A good case can be made for giving the court the
last say on the Constitution. Time and again
legislatures have treated constitutional rights with
callous indifference or outright hostility. Yet nothing
in the Constitution specifically forbids Congress from
increasing religious freedom by guarding against
state legislative indifference.
Arguably the original Smith decision was right.
That is, the First Amendment does not grant
religious people a privilege to ignore laws that bind
the entire society. Yet when Congress, speaking for
the people as a whole, decides that religion is
important enough in our culture to merit extra
protection, it seems presumptuous for the court to
insist on its own interpretation.
Presidential Immunity
A unanimous court turned back a plea from
President Clinton to put off until the conclusion of
his term in office a trial on Paula Jones' charges of
sexual harassment. The only surprise regarding this
question is that the president's lawyers thought they
had a chance of winning the point.
Presidents enjoy absolute immunity from liability
for damages caused by their official conduct while
occupying the White House. No precedent suggests
that the president should possess a privilege not
enjoyed by ordinary citizens to avoid a trial on a
claim unrelated to the presidency. Trial judges have
ample authority to schedule proceedings to avoid
excessively burdening the president. Given that
Clinton seems to have ample time to raise money for
his party, one suspects that his appeal was motivated
largely by politics.
Establishment Clause
Invoking the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, the court has for decades barred all
forms of government assistance directly to K-12
religious schools. States could not provide so much as
a map for the wall in a geography class at a sectarian
school. Aid could be given to the students themselves
(books, for example), provided the assistance was
part of a general program to public and private
school pupils.
Much of this law is now open for re-examination
after the court's recent decision allowing New York
to send teachers into religious schools for the purpose
of providing remedial education in secular subjects.
Prior to this decision, students in these schools were
obliged to receive such instruction at off-campus
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locations, sometimes in trailers parked outside school
grounds.
Superficially, the new ruling seems sensible,
notwithstanding that it required the overruling of
several key cases. New York was spending an
additional $15 million annually to cover the extra
costs of furnishing remedial courses in sites away
from religious schools. Bear in mind, though, that the
children involved attended religious schools by
choice, accepting both the advantages and limitations
the education offered. Had they been enrolled in
public schools, the issue of wasted millions would not
have arisen.
The larger problem created by the court's holding is
that it calls into question a sizable body of carefully
constructed precedent that fences religion and
government into separate domains. Strict separation
of church and state has permitted a multitude of
religions to flourish in this country, which is more
than can be said regarding any number of places
around the world where separation is not demanded.
One might respond that a little remedial help to kids
in parochial schools hardly portends an American
version of Iran. True, but constitutional law depends
on the consistent application of first principles, and
once these are breached, it is often difficult to define
a stopping point. Why not pay the salaries of all
teachers of "secular" subjects in religious schools? Or
build the facilities for such instruction?
The danger here is that religion will acquire a direct
interest in feeding at the public trough. Legislative
sessions could feature clerics battling public schools
for scarce education dollars. Legislators may be
tempted to assist schools of their faith, and so on. We
would all lose as religions become another type of
special pleader in the legislatures of the nation.
Free Speech
For generations the court has claimed exclusive
province over setting the boundaries between freedom
of speech and state regulation. And for an excellent
reason: Legislatures have long shown a tendency to
seek easy solutions to pressing (or perceived) social
problems at the expense of the core value of a
democratic society - the right to speak one's mind.
No better illustration of a quick and dirty fix can be
found than the Communications Decency Act, passed
by Congress for the laudable purpose of protecting
children from smut on the Internet. This is not a
laughing matter when you consider that it is
incredibly easy to find World Wide Web sites
featuring freely available pornography. Regardless,
six members of the court joined Justice Stevens in
condemning the CDA as an infringement on the right
of adults to access such material.
According to the court, Congress employed overly
vague terms, such as "indecent," to define what could
not be communicated over the Internet.
Unfortunately, this is another example of where
technology has rendered traditional constitutional
law obsolete. No one doubts that government can
make it a crime to give porn to children. But
verifying the age of users is impractical for most
providers of Internet content. Without an ability to
discern the ages of those accessing a Web site, it
would be impossible to restrict children without
simultaneously stopping adults from obtaining
constitutionally protected information.
On another First Amendment front, the court
approved portions of a lower court's injunction
requiring anti-abortion protesters to remain 15 feet
from clinics offering such services. Nevertheless,
women exercising their constitutional right to obtain
an abortion could not be shielded from the verbal
assaults of demonstrators. Invoking a dogma of free
speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist reminded those who
must run the gauntlet of screaming protesters: "Our
own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide breathing
speech to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment."
Search and Seizure
One of many adverse consequences of the
increasingly futile war on drugs has been a steady
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections against
police searches. The latest casualty came in a ruling
that the police may routinely order passengers out of
a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic infraction. In
this instance, the passenger dropped a packet of crack
while exiting the car. If you are applauding this
result, remember your applause the next time you are
stopped for speeding and ordered to stand by the side
of a freeway on a rainy winter night.
Sadly, the violence associated with drugs at times
gives officers a good reason for ordering everyone out
of a stopped car. Now they need no justification.
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy (not famous for coddling
criminals) lamented the "aggregation of thousands
upon thousands of petty indignities" that gradually
rob us of our freedoms.
If you agree with Kennedy's point, then you may
find some comfort in a case striking down a Georgia
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law requiring candidates for public office to take drug
tests. In previous years, the court upheld drug-testing
programs for student athletes, customs employees and
railway workers.
Those earlier decisions were justified on the basis of
"special need," such as guarding the safety of
railroads or combating the prevalence of drug use by
student athletes. No such rationale was present here,
as Georgia could not establish that candidates for
governor, the Legislature or the state courts were
using drugs.
While it is hard to quarrel with the demand for
showing a "special need" before obliging people to
render their urine unto Caesar, it is interesting that
the justices effectively shielded themselves from
similar drug screening. There is something to be said
for demanding that those who make and enforce the
drug laws be subjected to the same measures they
wish to impose on the rest of us.
A final case from the drug war involved the
constitutionality of "no knock" searches. A
unanimous court refused to give the police a blanket
license to execute such search warrants in drug
investigations. The police must have some reason to
think that knocking first would endanger them or
permit the occupants to dispose of drugs. This is a
minimal burden: The court was at pains to note that
the "showing is not high." We are forced to speculate,
nonetheless, why the court was unwilling to insist on
a comparable demonstration before the police roust
people out of their cars.
Although constitutional law is shaped by the court's
rulings, ordinary citizens almost never read the
court's product, save for newspaper excerpts from a
few cases. It may seem strange, then, that among the
institutions of government the court enjoys the most
respect from citizens. This is true despite the fact that
the Supreme Court justices are unelected officials
appointed for life. After the glare of confirmation
hearings pass, the justices recede into virtual
anonymity. Everyone knows about Justice Clarence
Thomas' alleged sexual harassment of Anita Hill, yet
how many can recite even a single ruling of his since
joining the court?
The court's continuing prestige may reflect simply
the fact that the justices' names are almost never
connected with scandals. Or maybe it is the mystery
of the institution. Shrouded in secrecy, the justices
preside in a building more akin to a temple than a
government office. Scholars scrutinize their opinions
with an intensity revealing a theologian's study of
sacred texts.
Unlike other branches of our government, the court
justifies its decisions through carefully reasoned
opinions, not press releases and sound bites. For
those who care about the future of our form of
government, it is vital to follow closely the court's




ONCE AGAIN, THE HIGH COURT TAKES ONLY SMALL STEPS
Outlook; The Washington Post
Sunday, July 6, 1997
Cass R. Sunstein
This term, the Supreme Court issued a remarkable
number of sensational decisions that appear to rule
definitively on some of the largest issues of the day:
free speech, federalism, religious liberty, gun control,
the right to assisted suicide, presidential immunity.
But appearances are misleading -- as are the hasty
interpretations of these decisions as unequivocal
answers to major questions in law and politics. In
fact, following Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
cautious lead, the heart of the current Court avoids
clear rules and final resolutions. It allows room for
Congress's and the states' continued democratic
deliberation, and to accommodate new judgments
about facts and values. It is a court that leaves
fundamental issues undecided.
Consider just one example. In a long and detailed
opinion, seemingly definitive and full of sonorous
language about American federalism, the Court, by a
5 to 4 majority, struck down portions of the Brady
Act, Congress's highly publicized effort to control
handgun sales. The Court held that in our system of
dual sovereignty, Congress could not compel local
law enforcement officers to do what Congress wanted
them to do. Justice Clarence Thomas, an ally
enthusiastic member of the majority, wrote a
remarkable two-paragraph opinion, attempting to
strengthen the Court's suggestion that the national
government has limited power to control guns. In his
view, the Second Amendment, protecting the right
"to keep and bear arms," seems "to contain an
express limitation on the government's authority."
But O'Connor, also a member of the majority, wrote
a separate two-paragraph opinion that took the
opposite tack: Her message was that the decision was
less significant than it seemed, for many things could
still be done to promote the objectives of the Brady
Act, and that some parts of the Brady Act, not yet at
issue before the Court, may well be constitutional.
What is important about this little exchange is that
it signals something about the current Supreme Court
as a whole -- and offers a clue to understanding the
Court's extraordinary year and even its basic
character. Several justices, most notably O'Connor
(but also Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter), are cautious
about broad rulings and ambitious pronouncements.
They like to decide cases on the narrowest possible
grounds. Thus O'Connor's concurrences typically
limit the reach of majority decisions, suggest ways of
accommodating both sides and insist to the losers
that they haven't lost everything -- or for all time. By
contrast, other justices, most notably Thomas (but
also Antonin Scalia and sometimes Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist), think that it is important for
the Court to lay down clear, bright-line rules,
producing stability and clarity in the law. These
justices do not hesitate to urge their colleagues to go
far beyond the facts of the individual case.
Physician-assisted suicide is a prime illustration. Of
course the issue is important in itself, but it is also
important because its resolution bears on the whole
question of whether there is a general constitutional
right to "privacy" (involving abortion, sexual
autonomy, parental rights and a great deal more).
Rehnquist wrote for the five-justice majority the very
opinion that he and Scalia have been (unsuccessfully)
urging on the Court in the abortion cases -- an
opinion that would limit the right of "privacy," and
indeed all fundamental rights under the due process
clause, to those rights that are "deeply rooted" in our
long-standing "traditions and practices." For better or
worse, this idea would basically bring to a halt the
protection of fundamental rights (aside from those
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights).
Five justices, including O'Connor, embraced the
Rehnquist-Scalia view, which seems at first glance
like very big news -- a stunning development that
goes well beyond what was necessary to decide the
particular case. But wait. O'Connor wrote a
(characteristic) separate opinion, suggesting that any
new development was small and incremental. In her
view, all the Court held was that there was no general
right to commit suicide. She cautioned that the Court
had not decided whether a competent person
experiencing great suffering had a constitutional
right to control the circumstances of an imminent
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death. That issue remained to be decided on another
day, she said. And, in a revealing and in its way
hilarious opening to his own separate opinion, Breyer
wrote, "I believe that Justice O'Connor's views, which
I share, have greater legal significance than the
Court's opinion suggests. I join her separate opinion,
except insofar as it joins the majority."
What does all this mean? In essence, that five of the
nine justices on the Court have signaled the possible
existence of a right to physician-assisted suicide in
compelling circumstances -- and this five-justice
majority has, in a way, rejected the whole approach
of Rehnquist's opinion (for the majority). O'Connor's
opinion speaks for a group of justices who are not
quite clear on how to handle fundamental rights
under the due process clause and who want to leave
the hardest and most contested issues for continuing
democratic (and judicial) debate.
This phenomenon is entirely characteristic of the
current Court. Consider the continuing legal
uncertainty about the dimensions of the right to free
speech in the modern communications era, involving
new technologies and the Internet. The Court has
allowed restrictions on the rights of cable television
operators, saying that Congress can require cable
television companies to carry local broadcast
programming. But it avoided any simple, sweeping
pronouncements.
It did invalidate the Communications Decency Act,
which was intended to protect children from sexually
explicit speech on the Internet, but this was no
path-breaking decision. It rested on the narrow
ground that the act, with then-Sen. J. James Exon's
(D-Neb.) poorly crafted ban on "indecent" speech,
was too vague to pass constitutional muster. A
decision to strike a law down on grounds of
vagueness leaves a great deal undecided and, in its
way, promotes rather than displaces the democratic
process:Instead of telling Congress to stay out of the
business of regulating the Internet, the decision
merely instructs Congress to speak with clarity.
Similarly, the Court has avoided simple rules in its
series of cases involving bizarrely shaped voting
districts redrawn to produce a different racial
makeup; it has insisted instead that constitutional
challenges would have to be decided on the basis of
the details. In Paula Jones's sexual harassment
lawsuit against President Clinton, the Court did rule
definitively against immunity, but emphasized the
district court's obligation to accommodate the
president's schedule. And, rather than deciding on
the constitutionality of the line-item veto, which
gives the president the right to cancel spending
measures, the Court took a path of avoidance and
indecision, ruling that disappointed senators do not
have standing to contest the law.
Nor is this general tendency limited to the past year.
In recent terms, the Court studiously refused to rule
broadly on affirmative action, the rights of
homosexuals and the status of punitive damage
awards. While invalidating specific affirmative action
programs, the Court insisted that some such
programs, if carefully designed, may well be
constitutional. While striking down Colorado's
constitutional amendment banning local laws against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the
Court said remarkably little about how the
Constitution would bear on other issues involving
homosexuality. While invalidating a $4 million
punitive damage award imposed on BMW of North
America for repainting a car without informing the
purchaser, the Court left open the general status of
punitive damage awards.
In all these cases, the Court resisted strong
arguments for clear rules from its own members.
Scalia, for example, would support a broad ban on
affirmative action programs, uphold all
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
find no constitutional barrier to punitive damage
awards. Thomas has been even more ambitious. He
would hold that commercial speech is entitled to the
same level of protection as political speech and he
would conclude, contrary to well-established
precedent, that campaign contributions are entitled to
the same level of protection as campaign
expenditures. But a majority refused to innovate in
these areas.
Some especially intriguing distinctions have started
to emerge between Scalia and Thomas, often grouped
together as conservative soul mates. The two are
indeed allied in their close attention to the Founders'
original understanding and in their enthusiasm for
rules and for overruling even recent precedent. But
there are large differences, too. Scalia sometimes
sounds like a kind of jurisprudential Barry
Goldwater; he is highly suspicious of anything that
seems like "social engineering," or the imposition of
an orthodoxy of the politically correct. Thomas's
opinions are quite different, even bolder and more
adventurous. He is most troubled not by social
engineering, but by any practice that seems to smack
of condescension or pity. Thus he sounds less like
Goldwater and, on occasion, more like some
combination of Booker T. Washington, the early
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20th-century advocate of black self-help, and
libertarian novelist Ayn Rand. Consider his unrivaled
skepticism about restrictions on campaign finance
and commercial advertising, his doubts about
affirmative action, his remarkable and even
somewhat bizarre invocation of the (moribund)
Second Amendment in the Brady Act case, in which
that amendment had not even been invoked by the
parties.
All in all, this is a Court that defies the usual
platitudes. Judicial restraint is certainly not the term
for a Supreme Court that, in just two days, strikes
down two popular acts of Congress (the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which would have required
states to justify apparently neutral laws with harmful
effects on religion, and the Communications Decency
Act). Certainly this is not a liberal court; its few
apparently "liberal" holdings are far milder than
many decisions of the Burger Court, let alone the
Warren Court.
It is true and important that the closest thing to a
"conservative bloc" (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
Anthony M. Kennedy and O'Connor) obtained
majorities in most of the key cases. But the Court
cannot easily be characterized as conservative in view
of its utter unwillingness to adhere to anything
representing a party line. Nor is this a court
consistently devoted to constitutional text; Scalia's
majority opinion invalidating the Brady Act candidly
acknowledged the absence of a textual basis for its
decision. Thus the highly diverse justices who
constitute this court are both unable and unwilling to
converge on clear rules or simple formulations,
postponing judgments for further deliberation within
national, state and local governments.
How are we to evaluate such a court? Scalia and
Thomas are right to insist that clear rules may be
appropriate and even indispensable as a way of
promoting predictability and stability and limiting
the discretion of future judges. Some of the most
glorious moments in American law have come from
decisions rooted in firm rules: Consider the
unambiguous and categorical ban on racial
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, the
prohibition on prior restraint of speech in the
Pentagon Papers case, or the broad endorsements of
judicial restraint at the end of the New Deal. But
O'Connor is right that there are occasions when
modesty and caution make sense. When technologies
are changing rapidly, when facts or values are
unclear and when democracy is in a state of moral
flux, courts should recognize that they may not have
the best or final answers. Broad pronouncements may
be wrong. They may be counterproductive even if
they are right. In these circumstances -- characteristic
of constitutional law today -- the Court may well do
best by proceeding in a way that fails to produce clear
winners and losers, and that is ambivalent or
catalytic rather than final or decisive. If these points
are right, O'Connor's distinctive concurring opinions
represent not a failure of judicial nerve, but a healthy
reminder that judges are mere participants in
America's process of democratic deliberation -- and
that judgments about basic principle are a political as
well as a judicial responsibility.
Copyright 1997
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THE SUPREME COURT'S BALANCE OF POWER
The Washington Post
Thursday, July 3, 1997
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court is often measured by its 5 to 4
decisions, the narrowly divided, hardest-fought
rulings of the term. In these cases -- 17 th term --
one justice can make the difference in the nation's
law. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a 1988 Ronald
Reagan appointee, was in the majority in 14 of these
cases, more than any other justice. Overall, Kennedy
stood with the majority 94 percent of the time. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, whom Reagan put on the
court in 1981, was in the majority in 12 of the closely
decided disputes and, overall, in the majority 89
percent of the time.
These statistics and others from the 1996-97 term
show that power continues to rest with these
conservative centrists, who generally favor enhanced
state sovereignty, greater limits on congressional
power, less governmental reliance on race-based
policies and narrow interpretations of civil rights
law.
Although in recent terms Kennedy and O'Connor
played the center more, signing on with
liberal-leaning justices in some key cases, this term
they were more inclined in the hottest cases to be
with the three most conservative members of the
bench: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. This
quintet voted together in eight cases. No other
five-justice combination prevailed nearly as much.
Among the key rulings decided by these five justices
were those striking down key portions of the Brady
gun control act; giving states greater leeway to lock
up sexual predators in mental institutions
indefinitely; making it harder for victims of police
brutality to sue local governments; and declaring that
it is sufficient for Georgia to have only one
majority-black congressional district.
In those cases, the dissenters were Justices John
Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer.
Stevens, a 1975 appointee of Gerald R. Ford, has
always been more liberal than his GOP-appointed
brethren. Souter, put on the bench by George Bush in
1990, was supposed to be a "home run" for
conservatives, in the words of then-White House
Chief of Staff John H Sununu. But Souter votes most
often with Ginsburg and Breyer (77 percent). The
two Clinton appointees, Ginsburg and Breyer, voted
together 81 percent.
The two Supreme Court justices who voted together
most often - remarkably, in all but one case -- were
Scalia and Thomas.
Scalia, a 1986 Ronald Reagan appointee, and
Thomas, a 1991 Bush jurist, approach the
Constitution similarly, putting great stock in
the text of the document as it was written more than
200 years ago and shunning contemporary
influences.
The court handed down a total of 80 signed
opinions in the term that began last October and
ended June 27. Stevens was the greatest dissenter,
standing with the minority in about a third of the
cases. The eldest of the justices, Stevens, 77, is
known for taking a pragmatic, independent, if not
eccentric, approach. Stevens also made up half of the
pair of justices who were least likely to agree with
each other. He and Scalia agreed in only 7 percent of
the non-unanimous cases.
Yet, the divisions on this court do not tell the whole
story. Three of the biggest cases of the term were
decided by essentially unanimous votes. By 9 to 0, the
justices struck down a law restricting indecency on
the Internet, ruled that Paula Jones's sexual
harassment lawsuit against President Clinton could
proceed and decided there is no constitutional right
to die with the help of a physician. The justices
splintered in their rationale on some points, but
essentially they closed ranks.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post
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THE COURT OF LAST RESORT; "THE SUPREMES" ARE AMERICA'S ULTIMATE ARBITERS
The Washington Post
Wednesday, October 9, 1996
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court's efforts to establish the law of the
land begin in secrecy and near solitude.
On Fridays during the court's term, which officially begins
on the first Monday in October, the nine justices meet in a
small, wood-paneled conference room to decide which
cases they deem worth hearing.
They meet without law clerks, secretaries or anyone else.
The most junior justice is seated nearest the door so he can
respond if anyone knocks.
As the last resort for people who believe that lower courts
have failed them and as arbiter of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court will, simply by selecting a case,
immediately lift the lives and human situations it contains
to national significance. Its rulings will affect not only the
two contesting parties, known as petitioner and respondent,
but also may change life for all Americans for generations.
The drama of the cases chosen may be traced, from the
"petition for certiorari" - a request that the Supreme Court
hear a case lost in a lower federal or state court - to the
resolution announced months later from the court's grand
mahogany bench.
About 7,000 petitions arrive by mail or messenger each
term at "the Marble Palace," as historian John Frank called
the court's building on First Street NE just east of the
Capitol. In the end, the justices hand down about 80 signed
rulings, each reflecting decades of legal precedent, the
current justices' beliefs and personalities and the enduring
decorum that defines this 207-year-old institution, one of
the most mysterious parts of the national government.
"Many of the court's ultimate decisions are predictable,
but there are always a number of surprises," said Maureen
Mahoney, who was a law clerk to Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist in the 1979-80 term and now represents private
clients before the court. "And it is often the surprising
rulings that have the broadest impact on Americans."
The public normally notices only the final decision in a
case. But much skirmishing occurs before that, most of it
behind the scenes in private debate, votes and negotiations
among the justices.
ACT I
The justices determine which cases to take. They never
explain the reason for their choices.
Whether or not a case is accepted "strikes me as a rather
subjective decision, made up in part of intuition and in part
of legal judgment," Rehnquist wrote in The Supreme
Court: How it Was, How it Is, his 1987 book about the
court.
Important factors, he said, are whether the legal question
has been decided differently by two lower courts and needs
resolution by the high court, whether a lower-court
decision conflicts with an existing Supreme Court ruling
and whether the issue could have significance beyond the
two parties in the case.
For example, the justices likely accepted the
sexual-harassment case brought by Paula Jones, a former
Arkansas state employee, against President Clinton
because it will test the important question of whether a
president should have to defend himself against a lawsuit
while in office.
They also agreed for the term that began Monday to
review a case challenging the constitutionality of a federal
handgun-registration law, no doubt in part because lower
courts are divided about whether the law, which requires
sheriffs to check a purchaser's background,
unconstitutionally burdens local officials.
But the justices do not automatically take on all cases
posing significant societal dilemmas. Last June, for
example, they refused to hear one on the legality of college
affirmative action programs. The case did not garner the
four votes needed to accept a petition for review and to
schedule oral arguments on it.
Before those votes are cast in the closed-door session,
however, a case must pass muster with several of the
youngest, least experienced lawyers in America - the 36
law clerks who serve the nine individual justices and who,
in effect, are their staff for a term.
These clerks, most often four to a justice, usually are recent
law school graduates and typically the cream of their Ivy
League schools.
It is the clerks who first winnow the 7,000 or so annual
petitions, settling on the select few that they believe the
justices themselves should consider. There is no set
number or quota for each week's conference.
With the clerks' memos in hand and in the closed
conference room, the justices summarily reject most of the
appeals. They discuss petitions flagged by one or more of
the justices. Then, according to justices' public accounts
over the years, they vote aloud, one at a time by seniority
but starting with the chief justice.
While the chiefjustice leads the meeting, the most junior
justice, now Stephen G. Breyer, makes handwritten notes
that will be passed to a clerk for public announcement of
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disposition of petitions. Rehnquist is known for running a
brisk session- "Bam! Ban! Barn!" one associate justice said
in describing the group's swift disposition of cases.
Among the richest sources of inside information about the
court are the papers of the late justice Thurgood Marshall
(1967-1991). They describe negotiations as cases moved
through the process. They show, for example, that only by
the bare minimum of four votes did the justices accept a
case that eventually yielded an important 1990 ruling on
religious freedom.
As is his responsibility by tradition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist laid out the facts of the case and lower court
rulings on it: Two Native Americans had been fired from
their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center after
ingesting peyote, a cactus that contains the hallucinogen
mescaline, as part of an ancient Indian religious ceremony.
The men were denied unemployment compensation by the
state of Oregon because officials said they were fired for
illegal conduct. State drug law prohibited use of peyote.
The men were never charged with a crime, and they sued
the state, contending that denial of unemployment
compensation violated their right to religious freedom. The
Oregon Supreme Court sided with them, ruling that the
anti-drug statute should not outlaw religious use of peyote.
The state appealed to the Supreme Court.
When the case first arrived here in 1987, Rehnquist voted
to hear it. Next in seniority and entitled to the second vote
was William J. Brennan Jr., who apparently was concerned
that the high court might overturn the Oregon Supreme
Court ruling and voted "no."
Next came Byron R. White, who voted "yes," the second
of four votes needed to accept. Marshall voted "no". Harry
A. Blackmun said he would vote "yes" if three other solid
votes were committed to hearing it. This vote to "join-3,"
as it is called, means that a justice is ambivalent but
willing to vote 'yes" if three colleagues want the case.
Lewis F. Powell Jr., John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day
O'Connor voted "no."
Then it was time for the last and then-newest justice.
Antonin Scalia voted to take the case, ensuring that with
Blackmun's "join-3" vote, the state's appeal of an order that
it must pay the men unemployment compensation would be
reviewed.
The case eventually would result in a decision against the
men. The justices overturned the state supreme court
decision saying there is no violation of the First
Amendment right of free exercise when a general state law
incidentally infringes on religious practices.
The majority opinion, written by Scalia, upset religious
groups across the spectrum and prompted Congress in 1993
to pass legislation to reverse the ruling's legal effects and
enhance protection for minority religious practices. That
effort marked one of the rare times that Congress
successfully negated the effects of a court ruling by saying
laws infringing on religious practices must meet a very
strict "compelling interest" test.
A few years earlier, Congress had failed to outlaw flag
burning, which the Supreme Court had ruled was a form of
free speech protected by the First Amendment. When
Congress first responded, in 1989, by passing a law
prohibiting flag desecration, the court ruled it
unconstitutional. Then when Congress tried in 1990 to
amend the Constitution, the effort never gamered the
necessary two-thirds votes in the House and Senate.
ACT II
Unlike the secret meeting to select cases, the court's next
step is quite public. Oral arguments occur in the Supreme
Cour's stately, burgundy draped, gold-trimmed courtroom
before a first-come, first-seated public audience.
On Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, starting in
October, the justices listen to lawyers present each side of
two or three cases a day. In the 1980s, when the court
accepted more cases, the justices heard arguments in four
cases a day.
Limited to 30 minutes each, one lawyer from each side
makes his or her best arguments. The scene is tense and
dramatic as the justices, wearing black robes and sitting in
individually sized, black leather chairs, vigorously
challenge the lawyers, sometimes consuming large parts of
their time allotments.
Even experienced appellate advocates at times become
flustered or freeze as they stand at the lectern below the
long bench. Still, a lawyer's appearance before the highest
court can be the highlight of a career. Lawyers have been
known to frame and hang the white quill pens they receive
as souvenirs.
"You don't have to be Clarence Darrow ... to successfully
argue a case before us," Rehnquist said in a speech last
May. "But you do have to be prepared.... And you must
expect hypothetical questions posing slightly different
factual situations from yours and be prepared to answer
them."
When the justices pose different hypothetical situations,
they are not necessarily trying to divert the lawyer. They
are looking at ways their decision might be applied in the
future. The justices also may use the occasion to influence
other justices, bolstering one side and undermining the
other.
During arguments about a Michigan law that led police to
confiscate a car in which a man had been caught having sex
with a prostitute, one question was how an innocent
co-owner of property - the man's wife, in this case - could
protect her interest in the property.
When assistant solicitor general Richard Seamon rose to
argue as a "friend of the court" in favor of Michigan and its
forfeiture law, the justices pressed him on his contention
that the wife could have better protected her interest as
co-owner of the car.
"What was she supposed to do?" Justice David H. Souter
asked, clearly sympathetic to the plight of the twice-burned
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wife.
Seamon said the wife "can make out the defense [as an
innocent owner] by showing that she took all reasonable
steps to prevent it."
"You're not taking the position that she was supposed to
call the police and say, you better watch out for
such-and-such a car because my husband is engaging in
illegal acts in it?" Souter asked.
Seamon reluctantly acknowledged that the federal
government believed that a co-owner should report illegal
activity involving the property, even if a wife must snitch
on her husband.
"So it's the position of the solicitor general's office that
wives should call the police when their husbands are using
prostitutes?" Justice Anthony M. Kennedy asked.
The laughter in the courtroom, which appeared to be
coming from the justices' clerks, prompted Kennedy to add,
"Don't let the laughter of clerks who have never even
argued a case in a municipal court deter you from your
answer."
Eventually, the confiscation was upheld 5-4, with Souter
and Kennedy among the dissenters.
While the give-and-take usually is dominated by arcane
legal references, occasionally a case inspires the justices to
use more common vernacular.
When they reviewed privacy issues surrounding a school
district requirement that student athletes submit urine
samples for drug testing, locker room life was topic A.
Rehnquist referred to "guys walking around naked," and
Breyer said providing a urine sample might not be so
intrusive since urination is a fact of life.
The lawyer representing a student who had protested the
testing conceded that everyone indeed urinates. Then, in a
break from decorum, the lawyer, facing tough questioning,
blurted, "In fact, I might do so here." The school district
won, 6-3.
For all their attendant drama, oral arguments are only one
part of the decision-making process. There also are written
briefs submitted by each side - the views of the solicitor
general, who is the federal government's top lawyer before
the court, and other amicus curiae, or "friends of the court."
Also, the justices review previous cases on a subject,
prepare their own interpretations of the law or
constitutional provision and sometimes, though rarely, turn
to outside experts on the issue.
For example, one of the most controversial elements of
the court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education (1954), striking down the "separate but equal"
doctrine long used to justify school segregation, was Chief
Justice Earl Warren's reference to sociological and
psychological studies. The studies concluded that
segregated schools stigmatized children.
The justices vote, sometimes more than once because they
may switch sides during the process.
The first vote on a case is taken in the week of oral
arguments. For cases heard on Mondays, the justices vote
on Wednesday afternoon, again in the secrecy of their
conference room. For cases heard on Tuesday and
Wednesday, they vote Friday.
After the vote, the most senior justice in the majority
assigns the task of writing the majority opinion. The most
senior justice on the losing side decides who will write the
main opinion for the dissenting viewpoint. The other
justices are free to write their own statements if they wish,
but the majority opinion speaks for the court.
Sometimes, justices say, writing an opinion that all
justices in the majority will sign is difficult. Sometimes,
justices discover through writing an opinion and trying to
justify it with prior court rulings that the case was not what
it seemed. On occasion, the chief justice has thrown up his
hands as the majority switched from its original position.
Referring first to Scalia by his nickname, Rehnquist
wrote: "After Nino circulated his draft opinion coming out
to 'reverse' rather than to 'affirm,' I reassigned this case to
myself. I thought that in keeping with previous practice,
whether or not well understood, it was desirable that
someone at least make an effort to write out the view on
the merits which had commanded a majority at conference.
After having made that effort, I have decided that Nino was
correct... I therefore assign the case back to Nino and join
his revised opinion."
Stevens, known for his singular legal approach, regularly
jokes about losing the majority as he writes the formal
opinion.
In a 1990 criminal case, he wrote to Rehnquist, "Dear
Chief: Having been a specialist in converting draft majority
opinions into dissents since my first term on the court
[1975], I can assure you that I will produce a draft 'with all
deliberate speed.' " Stevens indeed did lose the majority,
and a few weeks later when Rehnquist announced the
court's opinion, Stevens was in the dissent.
In many instances, the justices may be perfectly pleased
with what the author of the majority opinion is writing but
will offer thoughts for variations on the legal analysis or
language. The author's task is to preserve his or her
viewpoint, accommodate suggestions if it means keeping
the majority and not to turn off others in the group.
Based on what outsiders are able to discern from the
justices' public statements and from the opening of
once-private papers of some justices, the justices do not
trade votes during this process. Rather, they engage in a
constant conversation by way of memos.
Justice O'Connor once pointedly observed of this process,
as she herself was trying to induce another justice to
change his draft opinion, "I realize that it is much easier to
cast suggestions over the chefs shoulder than it is to have
one's head in the oven."
ACT 11
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Law clerks are heavily involved in this stage, writing
draft opinions, researching past cases that will support a
ruling, even strategizing. For example, as the justices were
deciding whether to uphold an Indiana law against nude
dancers in 1991, in the face of a First Amendment
challenge, a clerk wrote to Marshall:
"BRW [Byron R. White], the senior justice in the dissent,
has now circulated an opinion. I recommend that you join
it. The chiefs majority opinion has gotten no support, but
AS [Antonin Scalia] has circulated a concurrence that is
quite as damaging as would be the chiefs. I therefore
recommend that you join BRWs dissent right away, for
whatever momentum that might help build for the
dissenters."
But whatever Marshall might have tried to do, it didn't
matter. Rehnquist prevailed in a 5-4 decision rejecting the
challenge. The court said the law did not violate free
speech rights.
The give-and-take can last for weeks and months. But
fortunately, there is June, when the court traditionally
wraps up its work.
Beginning in early May, the court stops hearing oral
arguments and increases its public release of decisions.
Rulings traditionally are handed down on Mondays,
although as the court nears the end of the term, they are
announced on other days, too.
The media are never told in advance how many opinions
to expect on a given day. Reporters will be told whether it
is a "regular" day, meaning four or fewer opinions, or a
"heavy" day (five or more).
Returning to the very public forum of the courtroom, the
justice who has written the majority opinion briefly
announces the court's ruling from the bench.
Justice White (1962-1993) made the tersest of
summaries, giving the case number and saying it was on
file in the clerk's office. Today, many justices make
comparatively lengthy bench announcements, giving the
facts of the case, how lower courts ruled and details of the
high court's decision.
Last term, this last act produced a few dramatic moments.
When Justice David H. Souter dissented from a ruling that
gave states a major victory over Congress in an Indian
gambling dispute, he took the unusual step of reading
portions of his opinion from the bench, declaring that the
majority opinion "flies in the face of the Constitution's
text."
A few weeks later, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
before becoming a judge was a women's rights lawyer,
announced the court's ruling that Virginia Military
Institute's exclusion of women is unconstitutional. In the
opinion, she said she was relying on a major 1982 sexual
equality decision by O'Connor, the only other woman on
the bench. At that moment, Ginsburg looked up and
exchanged appreciative glances with O'Connor.
As the court's process ends and the justices begin their
long summer vacations, public response begins.
Just last term, the ruling against VMI prompted The
Citadel, a similarly situated military college in Charleston,
S.C., to open its doors to the first class of women. Last
month, VI'ffs board narrowly voted to do the same next
year.
Also, a court decision striking down two black-majority
and one Hispanic-majority voting districts in Texas
because they were drawn along racial lines meant the state
had to draw new district boundaries and hold special
elections this fall in 13 of Texas's 30 congressional
districts.
No matter how each term's rulings change American
government or individual lives, the nine justices usually
remain detached, almost never commenting on their work
but retuning to their conference room each October to start
the process again.
Copyright 1996, The Washington Post Co.
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JUSTICES GROWING IMPATIENT WITH IMPRECISION
The Washington Post
Monday, May 5, 1997
Joan Biskupic
Arguing a bankruptcy case before the Supreme
Court recently, Texas lawyer John J. Durkay thought
he could make a point by referring to the value of a
1954 Mustang.
"A '54 Mustang is worth real money," he said. But
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist caught him short.
"They didn't make Mustangs until '63," he said.
In a separate case before the court, Kenneth W.
Starr challenged a provision of federal whistleblower
law, only to be stopped by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, who asked for specifics. Kennedy wanted
to know what the "best case" was that supported the
argument the lawyer was making at the moment.
Surprised, Starr gave an answer based on a general
principle.
Kennedy repeated: "What's your best case for that?"
Starr didn't have a handy answer. "I can get you that
on rebuttal, your honor," he said, punting. But Starr,
the Whitewater independent counsel who was
arguing this case on behalf of a private client, ran out
of time and never got his chance.
In recent years, the Rehnquist court has been known
for spurring aggressive oral arguments. Now the
justices are showing a preference for on-the-spot
precision: in language, thought and, most important,
legal reasoning. They want it fast and to the point.
"This is a completely transformed court," said
Cardozo Law School Prof. Marci A. Hamilton, who
was a law clerk to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in
1989 and 1990 and argued an important religion case
this term. "The justices are so much more alive. It's
clear to me that they're doing their homework."
Rehnquist and O'Connor, now in important
positions of seniority, can be the most public sticklers
for precision. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer, appointed in 1993 and 1994, are
vigorous questioners who have helped set a new tone.
But even Justice John Paul Stevens, a 1975 Ford
appointee who cuts a lower profile, can challenge a
lawyer who fudges. When, for example, Illinois
solicitor general Barbara A. Preiner urged the court
to reject a death row inmate's claim, she described a
group of lawyers who had filed a "friend of the court"
brief for the inmate as practicing "almost exclusively
on behalf of defendants."
Stevens, whose home town is Chicago, called her on
that. "Going back to the amicus brief," he said, "it
does include a fair number of lawyers who do not
practice on behalf of criminal defendants, such as
former [Illinois] governor [James R.I Thompson,. .
. former [Illinois Supreme Court] justice Seymour
Simon... . There are quite a few in there who are not
representing defendants now, is that not right?"
"So it's not 'almost exclusively,' " he told her. "You
really want to modify that statement."
Longtime appellate lawyer Carter G. Phillips said
that, unlike previous courts, this one is listening and
weighing carefully what's being said in the
courtroom, not just relying on the written briefs
submitted by each side.
"They're clearly more attuned to language and want
you to identify where they can look something up"
while a session is underway. "That is a change," he
said. "Before, you could quote at length [from a
document] and no one asked exactly what you were
talking about."
The justices refer to their stacks of color-coded
briefs - blue, red, gray or green -- as they look down
from their grand mahogany bench.
When California lawyer Thomas E. Campagne
waved a brief at the justices earlier this term and
began referring to something called "Stipulation No.
59" to make his case against federal regulations
affecting the marketing of peaches, plums and
nectarines, Rehnquist quickly interrupted: "That isn't
terribly helpful to simply hold up a brief and say that
Stipulation No. 59.. . . If you want to make a point,
make it so that we can all understand it."
The justices want specifics. What does a federal
statute say, precisely? Which part of the Constitution
supports the case?
Many a lawyer has tried to quote from a prior court
ruling for his or her position, only to have at least
one knowing justice note that the line being quoted
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was written by dissenting justices or otherwise failed
to win the requisite five votes to be authoritative.
"People have a notion that the Supreme Court only
solves grandiose cases and does not get down to what
a statute or the Constitution says," -said appellate
specialist Alan Morrison of Public Citizen, a
government watchdog group. "I tell people [who are
preparing to argue before the court], 'It's important to
say how the statute really works . .. or how part of
the Constitution works.' "
In January, Georgia's assistant attorney general,
Patricia Guilday, had argued before the high court
that the 10th Amendment gives states the authority to
force political candidates to take a drug test. "The
10th Amendment says that a candidate restriction. .
is constitutionally valid if it is a reasonable . .
restriction upon the individual's fundamental rights,"
Guilday said.
"Well, I wouldn't have thought you could derive all
of that from the 10th Amendment," countered Chief
Justice Rehnquist. "It doesn't say anything about
ballot restrictions that I know of." (The amendment
says simply that the powers not delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution are reserved
for the states.)
A few weeks later, O'Connor was questioning Ohio
solicitor Jeffrey S. Sutton about his view that states
can "overprotect" religious freedom and did not need
Congress to intervene with its 1993 Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. She asked whether he
thought that by overprotecting religious practices a
state could breach the required separation of church
and state.
"I hope we've got a lot of room to overprotect
religious liberties," Sutton said. "It's something we
think is important. It's something we want to do. We
obviously don't want to do it in a way that it violates
the Establishment Clause, though."
Then Sutton, seeing the justices' perplexed faces,
declared what other lawyers may have thought but
never said: "Your visual cues aren't good."
Spectators and a few of the justices laughed.
Sometimes a lawyer knows that the court wants
precise answers but faces so many interruptions and
time pressures that he or she cannot satisfy the court.
John MI Rea, representing the state of California in
a labor case, was in his last seconds of an argument,
trying to answer a recurring question about
apprenticeship programs. He tried to draw a
distinction in the law. "It seems to me that a logical
line is this. . . ," he began.
But just as he was about to draw the "logical line,"
the red light at his lectern went on and Rehnquist
said, "Thank you, Mr. Rea. Your time has expired.
The case is submitted."
Woe is the lawyer who tries to continue without the
chiefs permission. Rehnquist has been known to tell
a lawyer to just sit down. But even the chief can get
it wrong.
The Mustang debuted at the New York World's Fair
in 1964, not 1963.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Co.
24
THE REHNQUIST REINS
The New York Times
October 6, 1996
David J. Garrow
WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RECONVENES
tomorrow morning, William H. Rehnquist will mark his
10th anniversary as the 16th Chief Justice of the United
States. The Rehnquist Court's first decade may best be
remembered for such surprisingly "liberal" decisions as
the 1992 reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade and this year's
vindication of gay rights in a case from Colorado. In
both exceptional cases, Rehnquist was in dissent on the
losing sides, but those outcomes are unrepresentative of
his winning record in crucial, if less publicized, areas of
the law.
Rehnquist's most far-reaching triumphs have come in
cases raising fundamental questions of federalism,
involving the distribution of power between the Federal
Government and the states. One year ago, in United
States v. Lopez, for the first time in 58 years a court
majority restricted Congress's ability to expand Federal
authority after it enacted an anti-gun-possession law.
This June, in the otherwise unsung death penalty case
of Felker v. Turpin, Rehnquist ratified a significant
victory in a long-standing war over the power of
Federal courts to review and potentially reverse state
inmates' criminal convictions. This seemingly abstruse
battle over greatly truncating Federal courts' habeas
corpus jurisdiction demonstrates how successfully
Rehnquist has extended his own staunchly conservative,
lifelong beliefs into a judicial agenda that has
significantly remade major portions of American law.
But as decisions like Romer v. Evans, the Colorado
gay rights case, and 1992's reaffirmation of Roe in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey exemplify, the "Rehnquist Court" is only
sometimes the Rehnquist Court. That's true only when
the Chief Justice is able to win the determinative fifth
vote of the one crucial Justice who most oftentimes is
the deciding voice whenever the Court is split 5 to 4 --
Anthony Kennedy. When he chooses to side with the
High Court's four moderates, the "Rehnquist Court" is
turned into the "Kennedy Court." In the meantime,
Rehnquist will no doubt continue his drive to shrink the
influence of Federal courts in American life.
MONDAY MORNING, JUNE 3,1996, MARKED A
POTENTIALLY culminating moment for the
72-year-old Chief Justice.
Just as it will be tomorrow, the court's magisterial
courtroom is packed to capacity. United States Senators
and members of the House sit toward the front. Former
clerks to several Justices have come from as far away as
California just to watch; senior members of the Court's
press corps squeeze onto two tightly packed wooden
benches on the left. Members of the marshal's staff
shush tourists in the rear of the intimate chamber.
At precisely 10 A.M., a marshal brings the courtroom
to its feet as the nine Justices emerge from behind the
velvet curtain to take their seats on the elevated bench.
Chief Justice Rehnquist declares that several decisions
are ready for announcement, and in quick succession
the authors of the majority opinions offer brief
summaries of the new holdings.
Only at 10:28 A.M. does Rehnquist reach the event
the capacity crowd has come to see. "We'll hear
argument now in No. 95-8836, Ellis Wayne Felker v.
Tony Turpin." The Chief Justice, too, has been waiting
for this opportunity for a long time.
The Court's regular argument calendar ended more
than five weeks earlier, on April 24; for all of May and
June, the Justices normally would have devoted
themselves simply to finishing up their opinions in
cases that had been argued during the standard
October-through-April schedule. However, on that very
same April 24, President Clinton signed into law a new
statute awkwardly titled the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.
Long under consideration by Congress, the new law
includes a host of provisions intended to reduce and
hasten Federal court review of criminal offenders'
challenges to the finality of their state court convictions
-- including challenges by convicted murderers
sentenced to death. Prisoners have an initial right to
appellate court review; those who fail can pursue
subsequent challenges by filing petitions for writs of
habeas corpus -- literally "you have the body" but in
essence a Federal court order overturning a state court
conviction. The new law imposes stringent limits on
any Federal court consideration of a second or
additional habeas petition from a convict. Death-row
prisoners often file petition after petition, thereby
delaying their executions even if their sentences are
never overturned; some noncapital felons file such
papers year after year.
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Opponents of the new law argued that, if allowed to
stand, it would eventually open the floodgates to
speedier executions of the 3,153 prisoners now on death
row nationwide. For Rehnquist, however, the limiting
of Federal habeas corpus reflects not some sort of
personal blood lust for the death penalty. It instead
bespeaks his commitment to a federalism-centered view
of American politics and government, which
encompasses many other issues in addition to Federal
court respect for the finality of state court criminal
convictions. "The core" of Rehnquist's theory, one
scholar has written, "is the idea of state sovereignty,"
above and beyond Federal Government control.
Testifying at his 1986 confirmation hearings for
promotion to Chief Justice, Rehnquist acknowledged
that "my personal preference has always been for the
feeling that if it can be done at the local level, do it
there. If it cannot be done at the local level, try it at the
state level, and if it cannot be done at the state level,
then you go to the national level."
Rehnquist strongly opposed an expansive habeas role
for the Federal courts even long before President
Richard M. Nixon nominated him to the Supreme Court
in the fall of 1971. Then a 47-year-old Assistant
Attorney General, Rehnquist had joined the Justice
Department in 1969 at the behest of his fellow
Arizonan, Deputy Attorney General Richard G.
Kleindienst, whom he had come to know during 15
years of law practice in Phoenix. But 1969 hadn't
marked Rehnquist's first job in Washington, for way
back in 1952 and 1953 --just after he had graduated
first in his class from Stanford Law School -- young
Rehnquist had served for 18 months as one of two law
clerks to the highly regarded Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson. Rehnquist had enjoyed his clerkship
immensely, but when he himself was nominated to the
High Court in 1971, his work for Jackson generated a
major controversy when a Rehnquist memorandum
arguing against any Supreme Court voiding of
segregated schools and for a continued endorsement of
the old doctrine of "separate but equal" was discovered
in Jackson's file on Brown v. Board of Education.
Rehnquist unpersuasively insisted -- as he would again
during his 1986 confirmation hearings for Chief Justice
-- that the memo represented an articulation of
Jackson's views rather than his own. The Senate
nonetheless confirmed him on a vote of 68 to 26.
Jackson's papers also contain a Rehnquist memo with
a minority view on another Brown case, Brown v.
Allen, a 1953 ruling little known to the general public
but justly famous among criminal law practitioners as
the modern fount of an expansive approach to Federal
courts' habeas jurisdiction. In that memo, Rehnquist
argued that Federal courts should not grant habeas
petitions involving any issue that had been considered
by a state court unless the defendant had been denied
the right to counsel. In 1953, that recommendation had
no more impact than did Rehnquist's advice in the other
Brown case, but three decades later, once he sat on the
High Court in his own right, habeas excesses
reappeared as a subject of his special concern. In a 1981
opinion involving a death-row petitioner, Coleman v.
Balkcom, Rehnquist complained that in light of
habeas's "increasing tendency to postpone or delay"
death-penalty enforcement, "stronger measures are
called for" beyond the Court's simple denial of repeated
death-row appeals.
Reminded of his Jackson clerkship memos in a 1985
interview with this Magazine -- the last such interview
Rehnquist has granted -- he frankly acknowledged that
"I don't know that my views have changed much from
that time." Four years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist
vented his continuing anger at repetitive filings in a 5-4
majority opinion rebuffing an application from an
ostensibly penniless petitioner named Jessie McDonald.
"Since 1971," Rehnquist observed, McDonald "has
made 73 separate filings with the Court, not including
this petition, which is his eighth so far this term."
Rejecting the solicitude of four dissenters who objected
to the majority's order instructing the clerk's office to
reject any further unpaid filings from McDonald,
Rehnquist emphasized that "every paper filed with the
clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or
frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's
limited resources."
A few months later, Rehnquist took up his capital
habeas cudgel in his role as head of the Judicial
Conference, the administrative arm of the Federal
judiciary. Failing in an effort to obtain majority support
for a recommendation calling upon Congress to limit
Federal habeas jurisdiction, Rehnquist nonetheless
forwarded a report to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
In an unprecedented public letter, 14 of the conference's
26 other members objected to the Chief Justice's action.
Rehnquist refused to back down.
Congress did not act, but in April 1991 Rehnquist
achieved much of his legislative goal judicially in a 6-3
court ruling that starkly limited successive habeas
petitions and vindicated his 1981 call for action in
Coleman. Decrying "the abusive petitions that in recent
years have threatened to undermine the integrity of the
habeas corpus process," the majority stressed that
"perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions
disparages the entire criminal justice system."
But even that ruling in McCleskey v. Zant did not set
as high a hurdle to successive petitions as Rehnquist
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sought. Warning that America cannot afford "the
luxury of state and Federal courts that work at cross
purposes or irrationally duplicate" each others' efforts,
the Chief Justice continued to emphasize that "capital
habeas corpus still cries out for reform." Come April
1996, after 24 years on the court and 10 years as Chief
Justice, it seemed with the Felker case that Rehnquist's
wish had finally come true.
WHEN REHNQUIST WAS NOMINATED TO
SUCCEED THE retiring Warren E. Burger as Chief
Justice by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, his
colleagues were unanimously pleased and supportive.
Fourteen years of working together had built good
personal relations even between Rehnquist and his
ideological opposites, William J. Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall. Brennan startled one acquaintance
by informing him that "Bill Rehnquist is my best friend
up here," and a Washington attorney, John D. Lane,
who privately interviewed all seven other Justices on
behalf of the American Bar Association's Committee on
the Federal Judiciary, informed the Senate Judiciary
Committee that Rehnquist's nomination was met with
"genuine enthusiasm on the part of not only his
colleagues on the Court but others who served the Court
in a staff capacity and some of the relatively lowly paid
individuals at the Court. There was almost a unanimous
feeling of joy."
Rehnquist's colleagues looked forward to his
installation as "Chief" in part because they welcomed
the departure of his overbearing, manipulative and
less-than-brilliant predecessor, Burger, who had
succeeded the legendary Earl Warren 17 years earlier.
Reporters always stressed that Burger looked the part of
Chief Justice of the United States, but among his fellow
Justices there was virtually unanimous agreement that
his skills at leading the Conference -- the Justices' own
name for their group of nine -- had been woefully
lacking. John Lane told the Judiciary Committee that
one Justice said that "he looks for a tremendous
improvement in the functioning of this Court" under
Rehnquist. Based upon all the Justices' comments, Lane
reported, "I came away with a very strong opinion that
Justice Rehnquist will make an excellent Chief Justice."
Much of the 1986 debate over Rehnquist's promotion
focused upon newly augmented allegations that 20-odd
years earlier he had taken part in Republican Party
efforts to intimidate black voters at Phoenix polling
places. The charges were not provable, but the final
Senate confirmation vote of 65 to 33 was closer than
Rehnquist's backers had expected and in its wake the
new Chief Justice privately told friends that he felt the
Judiciary Committee hearings had treated him very
badly. "He took it somewhat personally," one
acquaintance remembered, but within the Court there
was immediate agreement that Rehnquist was far
superior to Burger in leading the Conference's
discussion of cases.
Ten years before, in a 1976 law review essay on
"Chief Justices I Never Knew," Rehnquist had stressed
the importance of firmly run sessions in which each
Justice, speaking in order of seniority, stated his views
succinctly and without interruption: "A give and take
discussion between nine normal human beings, in
which each participates equally, is not feasible." He also
acknowledged how a "Chief Justice has a notable
advantage over his brethren: he states the case first and
analyzes the law governing it first. If he cannot, with
this advantage, maximize the impact of his views,
subsequent interruptions of colleagues or digressions on
his part or by others will not succeed either." Citing
Harlan Fiske Stone and Felix Frankfurter as brilliant
Justices of the past whose efforts to influence their
colleagues had generally failed, Rehnquist added that
"the power of persuasion is a subtle skill, dependent on
quality rather than quantity."
In his 1987 book, "The Supreme Court," Rehnquist
gently noted that "I have tried to make my opening
presentation of a case somewhat shorter than Chief
Justice Burger made his." Justice Harry A. Blackmun
often disagreed substantively with Rehnquist, but he
was quick to praise Rehnquist's management skills.
"The Chief in conference is a splendid administrator,"
he told one semiprivate gathering. Unlike the Burger
years, "we get through in a hurry. If there's anything to
be criticized about it, he gets through it in too much of
a hurry at times."
Warren Burger was seen by his colleagues as a Chief
who often abused his power to assign the writing of
majority opinions whenever he was not in dissent. One
Rehnquist clerk from the mid-1970's still recalls how
Burger, unhappy with the political humor of a
Rehnquist-produced skit at the Court's 1975 Christmas
party, the next month assigned Rehnquist only one
opinion, in an Indian tax case. Most Justices expected
Rehnquist to eschew such gamesmanship, and the
record of the past decade generally bears that out. Some
former clerks contend in private that in recent years
Anthony Kennedy has fared far better in receiving
important assignments from Rehnquist than other
Justices, but Rehnquist as Chief is far more concerned
with maximizing the speed and efficiency of the Court's
opinion-writing than with playing favorites.
In a 1989 memo to his colleagues, Rehnquist divulged
that "the principal rule I have followed in assigning
opinions is to give everyone approximately the same
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number of assignments of opinions for the Court during
any one term." But, he warned, any Justice who failed
to circulate a first draft of a majority opinion within
four weeks or who failed to circulate the first draft of an
anticipated dissent within four weeks of the majority
opinion or who had not voted in any case in which both
majority and dissenting opinions had circulated would
now be looked upon less favorably. "It only makes
sense," he asserted, "to give some preference to those
who are 'current' with respect to past work."
Rehnquist's announcement provoked an immediate
objection from John Paul Stevens, now the
second-most-senior Justice to the Chief himself. An
iconoclastic and generally liberal thinker, Stevens in
recent years has outpaced all of his colleagues in his
number of individual dissents and concurrences.
Reminding Rehnquist that "too much emphasis on
speed can have an adverse effect on quality," Stevens
warned that it "may be unwise to rely too heavily" on
rigid deadlines, especially when a Justice's investment
in a major dissent, or a handful of dissents, might create
a lag. "I do not think a Justice's share of majority
opinions should be reduced because he is temporarily
preoccupied with such an opinion, or because he is out
of step with the majority in a large number of cases."
Rehnquist remained largely unmoved, chiding his
colleagues just a few weeks later about several decisions
that were running behind schedule. "I suggest that we
make a genuine effort to get these cases down 'with all
deliberate speed.' "
EIGHT DAYS AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON
SIGNED THE NEW HABEAS legislation into law, a
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit applied the statute in denying a request from a
Georgia death-row inmate, Ellis Wayne Felker, to file
a successive petition. Convicted 13 years earlier of
murdering a 19-year-old woman soon after being
released from prison on a prior felony conviction,
Felker now was finally facing actual execution; three
times before, the Supreme Court had turned aside
appeals. Later that very same day, May 2, Felker's
attorneys asked the High Court to review how the new
law prohibited Felker from appealing the circuit court's
refusal.
Less than 24 hours later, the Supreme Court granted
Felker's request for a hearing and set oral argument on
his challenge to the new law for exactly one month
later. The Court's swift action -- the first such
accelerated hearing in six years and the fastest grant of
review since the famous Pentagon Papers case, New
York Times Co. v. United States, a quarter-century
earlier -- brought a cry of protest from the four least
conservative Justices, John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
Formally dissenting, they called the majority's action
"both unnecessary and profoundly unwise" and declared
that review of the new law "surely should be undertaken
-with the utmost deliberation, rather than unseemly
haste."
One question posed by Felker was whether the new
limits on appeals involving second or successive habeas
petitions represented a Congressional diminution of the
Supreme Court's own appellate jurisdiction. That would
be a constitutional issue of the highest order; not since
the Civil War era had the Court directly confronted it.
Felker's lawyers, focusing on an avenue Congress had
failed to address, noted in their brief that the new law
did not expressly affect the Court's authority to consider
"original" habeas petitions filed directly with it.
Conceding that the High Court's use of "original
habeas" would be "exceptional and discretionary,"
Felker's attorneys nonetheless acknowledged that "no
unconstitutional interference with this Court's appellate
jurisdiction exists if Congress merely eliminates one
procedure for review but leaves in place an equally
efficacious alternative."
Henry P. Monaghan, a Columbia University law
professor and an experienced Supreme Court advocate,
spoke for Felker when oral argument got under way on
June 3. The present-day Rehnquist Court is as vocal and
energetic a nine-member bench as any attorney could
imagine confronting (only Justice Clarence Thomas is
usually silent, but the liberal icons William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall were likewise generally quiet),
and Rehnquist himself -- along with Justices Souter,
Breyer, Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia -- is an outspoken
questioner, as both Monaghan and his opponent, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Susan V. Boleyn of
Georgia, soon found. "Why shouldn't we just try to
apply the statute as written?" asked Rehnquist with
some exasperation. "I mean, rather than trying to
torture some meaning out of it that's not there?"
Monaghan tried to demur, but drolly conceded that
"this statute passed by Congress with respect to second
petitions is not the work of Attila the Hun."
Susan Boleyn, however, faced a far tougher grilling.
"That's not a very specific position, Ms. Boleyn," the
Chief Justice interjected before she had uttered her
fourth sentence. Peppering her with questions,
Rehnquist asked how she would distinguish a
19th-century decision, Ex Parte Yerger. Boleyn
struggled. "Well, I think that this Court has recognized
exceptions to its jurisdiction both in the constitutional
venue under Article III --." An unhappy Rehnquist cut
her off. "Are you familiar with the Yerger case?" "Yes,
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Your Honor, but I'm not familiar with what exactly
you're asking me to respond to." It only got worse.
Breyer, telling her, "I'm sorry, I don't understand,"
asked Boleyn a fast-paced hypothetical and demanded
an answer. "Do we have jurisdiction to hear it? Yes or
no." Boleyn said no, but Breyer objected: "I thought
from your brief the answer was yes."
Asked in 1992 by C-Span's Brian Lamb whether he
could tell if attorneys are nervous during oral argument,
Rehnquist jocularly replied that "I assume they're all
nervous -- they should be." Occasionally -- most often
in the months before his wife's slow death from cancer
in October 1991 - Rehnquist has rebuked or snapped at
lawyers who have been unprepared or who have
committed the tiny but grievous sin of calling him
Judge rather than Chief Justice.
The day after the Felker argument, the Justices met in
private conference to discuss the case. The substance of
that meeting isn't likely to be known for a long time;
accounts of conference discussions generally become
available only years after the event, with release of the
handwritten notes of one or more Justices. Even then,
some Justices' papers -- Thurgood Marshall's are the
most recent example -- shed next to no light on
conference discussions, for not all Justices take notes.
Those of William 0. Douglas and Brennan offer
reliable guides to the 1960's, 70's and 80's, but every
modem Court scholar knows full well that the ultimate
treasure trove for the years 1970 through 1994 will, in
time, be the conference notes of now-retired Justice
Blackmun.
In his own chambers, Rehnquist instructs each of his
three clerks to have their first drafts of his opinions
ready for his review within 10 to 14 days. Some wags
insist that Rehnquist has three clerks -- seven other
Justices now have four, Stevens has three -- primarily to
ease the arrangements for his weekly tennis-match
doubles, but Rehnquist treats his young aides in a
warm, low-key manner. He revises their drafts by orally
dictating amended wording into a recorder, and he
volunteered in his 1987 book that "I go through the
draft with a view to shortening it, simplifying it and
clarifying it."
In Rehnquist's first 15 years on the Court,
commentators praised his writing as "clear, lucid, brief
and mercifully free of bureaucratese." One commended
"the somewhat peculiar references to history, the
classics and gamesmanship with which Rehnquist likes
to sprinkle his opinions" -- this June a Rehnquist
concurrence included a passing reference to "Grover
Cleveland's second inaugural address" -- but since 1986
such acclaim has gradually diminished, with critics
noting "the characteristic terseness of a Rehnquist
opinion" and journalists labeling his prose "dry and to
the point."
Rehnquist's June 28 opinion announcing the Court's
unanimous -- including the four Justices who had
protested the accelerated hearing -- resolution of Felker
v. Turpin manifested all these traits. Back in 1987,
Rehnquist acknowledged how "the Chief Justice is
expected to retain for himself some opinions that he
regards as of great significance," but Rehnquist
traditionally has written a disproportionate number of
criminal law rulings. The 12 1/2-page Felker decision
had been written, edited and circulated for other
Justices' comments and agreement in little more than
three weeks' time, and the substance of Rehnquist's --
and the Court's -- holding followed closely from the
implications of the questions Rehnquist had put to
Monaghan and Boleyn back on June 3.
The new statute "makes no mention of our authority
to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this
Court" and thus, fully in keeping with Ex Parte Yerger,
it "has not repealed our authority to entertain" such
petitions.
Therefore, Rehnquist held, "there can be no plausible
argument that the Act has deprived this Court of
appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III." No
constitutional collision thereby occurred, and the new
statutory restrictions on Federal court consideration of
successive habeas petitions could remain fully in place.
Convicts and death-row prisoners could send "original"
petitions directly to the High Court, but -- just as
Felker's lawyers had conceded in their brief -- only in a
rare instance of "exceptional circumstances" would such
an appeal be granted.
Felker's own habeas request was denied; Georgia has
not yet set a new date for Felker's execution.
Some habeas specialists, pointing back to Rehnquist's
earlier 1991 judicial breakthrough in McCleskey,
dismiss Felker's actual holding as "relatively
insignificant." They emphasize that several pending
challenges to other particular provisions of the new law,
including Lindh v. Murphy, a case that was decided by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
in late September, are likely to force Rehnquist and his
colleagues to revisit the habeas battlefield sometime in
1997.
But such characterizations unintentionally minimize
the extent and scale of Rehnquist's long-term agenda
and long-term victory. Federal habeas jurisdiction is
now only a shadow of what it was when Rehnquist first
joined the Supreme Court, and what in 1981 in
Coleman was a lonely individual call for action has now
won decisive support from a solid Court majority and
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from bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress as
well as an ostensibly liberal Democratic President. Not
long after Ellis Wayne Felker finally goes to the electric
chair, the entire pace of death-row executions all across
America will pick up substantial speed as one habeas
petition after another is quickly cast-aside by the courts.
Rehnquist's victory may not yet be 100 percent
complete; his triumph nonetheless is remarkably
impressive and still growing.
FELKER IS THE LATEST IN A LINE OF
FEDERALISM CASES THAT for Rehnquist began
with a 1975 solo dissent in Fry v. United States, an
opinion that directly foreshadowed the landmark 5-4
majority victory he would win exactly 20 years later in
United States v. Lopez. In 1975, writing only for
himself, Rehnquist had advocated "a concept of
constitutional federalism which should ... limit federal
power under the Commerce Clause." In Lopez, writing
on behalf of a 5-vote majority, Rehnquist dismissed the
Justice Department's defense of the Federal
anti-gun-possession law and declared that "if we were
to accept the Government's arguments, we are
hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate."
As early as 1982, a Yale Law Journal analysis of
Rehnquist's jurisprudence by H. Jefferson Powell (now
a high-ranking Clinton Justice Department appointee)
cogently identified "federalism's role as the organizing
principle in Rehnquist's work" and persuasively
concluded that "Rehnquist's federalism does form a
consistent constitutional theory."
More than 10 years later, in one of the three most
important decisions of the 1995-96 term, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, another 5-vote Rehnquist
majority forthrightly declared that "each State is a
sovereign entity in our Federal system." Dissenting
vigorously, Justice Souter protested how Rehnquist was
deciding "for the first time since the founding of the
Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a
State to the jurisdiction of a Federal court at the behest
of an individual asserting a Federal right." Souter's
objection brought him a harsh rebuke from the Chief:
the dissent's "undocumented and highly speculative
extralegal explanation ... is a disservice to the Court's
traditional method of adjudication."
One core principle of Rehnquist's federalism, as the
habeas battle has reflected, is a firm belief in a modest
-- some would say excessively modest -- political and
supervisory role for the Federal courts. Back in the early
1980's, the annual docket of the Supreme Court itself --
the number of cases it chooses to hear, not the
thousands upon thousands it turns aside -- had grown to
a peak of 151. Many voices, including both Burger and
Rehnquist's, called unsuccessfully for the creation of a
new, nationwide court of appeals to ease the pressure on
the High Court's docket, but the idea died aborning and
in- recent years- has -completely vanished from both
public -- and private -- discussion.
At his 1986 confirmation hearings, Rehnquist told the
Senate Judiciary Committee that "I think the 150 cases
that we have turned out quite regularly over a period of
10 or 15 years is just about where we should be at."
Addressing whether that load might be too great and
noting how the caseloads of Federal district and
appellate courts were increasing rapidly, Rehnquist said
that "my own feeling is that all the courts are so much
busier today than they have been in the past, that there
would be something almost unseemly about the
Supreme Court saying, you know, everybody else is
deciding twice as many cases as they ever have before,
but we are going to go back to two-thirds as many as we
did before."
A year later, in his 1987 book, Rehnquist cited the
150 figure and observed that "we are stretched quite
thin trying to do what we ought to do." Privately, inside
the Court, Rehnquist brooded about the annual "June
crunch" of backlogged decisions awaiting finished
opinions and suggested to his colleagues the
"desirability of cutting down the number of cases set for
argument in April," toward the end of the Court's year.
But year by year the Court's annual caseload has shrunk
further and further: from 132 cases in 1988-89 to 129
in 1989-90, to 112 in 1990-91, to 108 in 1991-92, to
107 in 1992-93, markedly to 84 in 1993-94, then to 82
in 1994-95 and finally to 75 in the just-completed term
of 1995-96.
In 1986, Rehnquist had volunteered that a one-third
decline in the Court's annual caseload from 150 to 100
would be "unseemly," but on the 10th anniversary of his
statement, the Court had reduced its annual workload
by more than half -- from 151 to 75. Granted, a 1988
statute had virtually eliminated some mandatory
appeals that the Court previously had been obligated to
hear, whether or not a minimum of four Justices voted
to accept the case, but the issue of the "incredible
shrinking docket" -- what Court watchers call it -- has
been one of the most striking developments of the
Rehnquist years.
The Court, of course, issues no explanations for even
so momentous a trend, but in April 1995, at the Third
Circuit's annual judicial conference in White Sulphur
Springs, W.Va., Justice Souter spoke extemporaneously
about the docket shrinkage in remarks that were
virtually unprecedented in their public frankness.
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Referring back to the early 1980's, when he was still an
obscure New Hampshire state judge, Souter recalled
that in reading Supreme Court opinions at the time, it
"seemed to me . . some of those opinions had the
indicia of rush and hurriedness about them." Now he
realized, given the caseloads of those years, that those
short-comings "could not have been otherwise and the
remarkable thing is that the number of really fine things
that came down in that period was as high as it was."
Souter said he was "amazed" that the docket annually
had continued to shrink throughout the 1990's, but he
stressed that "nobody sets a quota; nobody sits at the
conference table and says: 'We've taken too much. We
must pull back.' . . . It simply has happened."
Identifying a host of contributing factors, Souter noted
the "diminishing supply" of new Federal statutes in the
late 1980's and early 1990's, and how "not much
antitrust work" and "not much civil rights" work,
beyond voting cases, had been generated by the Reagan
and Bush Administrations' Justice Department. In the
criminal area, "drug prosecution does not make for
Supreme Court cases these days" because of how Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure standards have "been
pretty much raked over. ... The basic law, the basic
standards which have been governing and do govern
most of the appeals that people want to bring to us are
products of the 60's and the 70's and the 80's. There
hasn't been an awful lot for us to take."
In addition, Souter added, according to a
comprehensive account of his remarks in the
Pennsylvania Law Weekly, 12 years of Reagan-Bush
judicial nominations had produced "a relative
homogeneity" and "a diminished level of philosophical
division within the Federal courts." But, he emphasized,
"I know of no one on my Court who thinks that we're
turning away cases which by traditional standards ...
we should be taking. In fact, it's just the contrary."
Once, he confessed, when the numbers were
declining, "I said out loud as well as to myself that if
that continued, I was going to start voting to take
interesting Federal questions whether there was a
conflict [among lower Federal courts] or not." However,
Souter went on, "those were rash words," for "as it
turned out, I didn't have to make good on that" because
more cases began attracting 4 or more affirmative votes.
"About 100 a year is about right," Souter concluded,
and the number for the upcoming 1996-97 term seems
destined to rise from this past year's remarkable
minimum of 75.
With a total caseload of 75 (34 of which were decided
unanimously), there are not all that many opinions to
spread out over nine months of work for nine Justices --
and 34 law clerks. The image of clerks working
seven-day-a-week, 12-hour-a-day jobs is a polite fiction
of the past, and -- though it is considered rude to
mention it - many Court observers know that a typical
at-the-office workday for the Chief Justice of the United
States often stretches from about 9:10 A.M. to 2:30
P.M. Some Justices -- Souter, Kennedy and Stevens
among them -- work decidedly longer hours, but
Rehnquist's crusade to shrink the role and
responsibilities of the Federal courts has definitely born
fruit right at home.
Rehnquist has certainly registered historic doctrinal
achievements -- in habeas law, in United States v.
Lopez, in Seminole Tribe and in the 1994 "takings
clause" decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, but there is
no denying Rehnquist has been on the losing side in the
two most important, highly visible constitutional
holdings of the last five years: 1992's vindication of
abortion rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and,
just a few months ago, the remarkable voiding of a
homophobic, antigay Colorado state constitutional
amendment in Romer v. Evans. The 6-3 Romer ruling,
in which two swing Justices, Anthony Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor, sided with the "liberal"
foursome of Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
rather than with Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, was
without doubt the most important and symbolically
momentous decision of the 1995-96 term.
Romer's majority opinion, written by Kennedy,
featured a rhetorical verve rare for the High Court. The
Colorado amendment "seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class that it affects," Kennedy
explained, and "disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law
is unprecedented in our jurisprudence." Declaring that
"it is not within our constitutional tradition to enact
laws of this sort," Kennedy pointed out that a statute
"declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for
one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of
the laws in the most literal sense." The state
amendment "classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot
so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."
In a style and tone to which his colleagues have
become all too well accustomed, Scalia angrily and
vituperatively dissented. Joined by both Rehnquist and
Thomas, Scalia protested that the majority's holding
"places the prestige of this institution behind the
proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as
reprehensible as racial or religious bias." Avowing that
his fellow Justices have "no business imposing upon all
Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from
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which the Members of this institution are selected,"
Scalia alleged that "our constitutional jurisprudence has
achieved terminal silliness" and complained of how
Kennedy's opinion was "so long on emotiN e utterance
and so short on relevant legal citation." Declaring that
Colorado's action was "eminently -reasonable" -since
citizens are "entitled to be hostile toward homosexual
conduct," Scalia maintained that "the degree of hostility
reflected by" the state enactment was "the smallest
conceivable." His final blast was explicitly
contemptuous: "Today's opinion has no foundation in
American constitutional law, and barely pretends to."
BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT JUSTICE ON the
1996 Rehnquist court is not the angry Antonin Scalia;
it's the man who ascended to the Court in the wake of
Robert H. Bork's rejection: Anthony Kennedy. A quiet
and thoughtful Californian, Kennedy throughout his
eight-year tenure has been both the crucial fifth vote for
virtually all of Rehnquist's major victories and the
decisive vote and voice when Rehnquist has suffered
historic defeats in cases like Casey and Romer.
Occasionally apologetic in tone ("sometimes we must
make decisions we do not like," Kennedy volunteered in
the 1989 flag-burning decision, Texas v. Johnson),
Kennedy term after term has been the balance wheel of
the Rehnquist Court. Early on, in 1988-89, when
Rehnquist and the now-retired William Brennan
disagreed in every one of that year's 31 5-4 outcomes,
Kennedy was with Rehnquist 29 times. (Johnson was
one of the two exceptions.) In 1991-92, when Kennedy
dissented from only 8 of the term's 108 decisions, his
crucial "liberal" votes in both Casey and an important
school prayer decision, Lee v. Weisman, drew intense
flack from conservative critics.
The following term, 1992-93, Kennedy dissented in
only 5 of 107 cases, and the year after that, when he
was in the majority in every one of the term's 14 5-4
decisions, he again dissented in only 5 cases out of 84.
In 1994-95, Kennedy was in the majority in 13 of the
term's 16 5-4 cases, including both Lopez and the
highly publicized Congressional term limits decision,
and in the just-completed 1995-96 term, Kennedy again
was the Court's least frequent dissenter (in just 5 of 75
cases) and was in the majority in 9 of the 12 5-4
outcomes.
Now Kennedy is again under fire from extreme
conservatives for his memorable majority opinion in
Romer (National Review magazine labels him "the
dimmest of the Court's intellectual lights"), but among
serious Court watchers the impression is growing that
Kennedy has more than found his footing. David
O'Brien of the University of Virginia calls Kennedy
"more principled, less of a pragmatist" than other
Justices. Peter J. Rubin, a Washington attorney and a
former two-year High Court clerk, points out that
Kennedy "understands the moment of what he's doing"
and stresses how there can be "no question after Romer
about his integrity and courage."
Legal historians sometimes wonder whether the
"Brennan Court" and the "Powell Court" might actually
be more accurate monikers for the 1960's, 70's and early
80's than the "Warren Court" and the "Burger Court."
And in that same spirit, Peter Rubin readily agrees that,
yes, "it's the Kennedy Court." But, Romer and Casey
notwithstanding, in most other particulars the court of
1996 is indeed the "Rehnquist Court," and it is likely to
stay the Rehnquist Court for longer than most
commentators now think.
Prior to the death of his wife, Nan, in October 1991,
most people who knew Rehnquist expected him to step
down as Chief Justice sooner rather than later. In July
1991, Rehnquist apologetically turned down the newly
retired Thurgood Marshall's request for home-to-office
transportation in a court car, while adding that "in all
probability I will be in the same boat you are within a
couple of years." Eleven months later, Rehnquist told
C-Span's Brian Lamb that while he enjoyed his job, "I
wouldn't want to hold it forever." In September 1995,
when he underwent major back surgery to remedy a
long-festering problem that had suddenly mushroomed
into crippling pain, what Tony Mauro of Legal Times
called Rehnquist's "rumored plan for retiring from the
Court after the next Presidential election" looked all the
more certain.
But a wide sample of former Rehnquist clerks say
"not so" and predict against any Rehnquist retirement
in the summer of 1997, especially -- as some of them
hesitantly volunteer -- if Bill Clinton is re-elected this
November. The Wall Street Journal columnist Paul
Gigot has slyly pronounced Rehnquist's scheduled
departure, but a former clerk says the Chief already has
begun hiring the clerks who will join him next summer.
"I think he's too committed and too interested in
winning the battles he's been fighting to retire during
the Presidency of a Democrat," says one Court insider
with a high personal opinion of Rehnquist. He adds,
with emphasis, that the Chief is "extraordinarily
politically savvy" and that Bill Rehnquist "plays for the
long, long, long run," as his entire career consistently
demonstrates.
"He's more inclined to stay," says another former
Rehnquist clerk who keeps in regular touch and who
feels that the Chief does not want to leave during a
Democratic Presidency but "would never say it."
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"He enjoys his work," this clerk states."He never
expected to be in the majority as much as he is now,"
and the ongoing victories -- like Lopez and Seminole
Tribe on federalism, and in the habeas arena with cases
like Felker -- all incline him to stay, not retire. "He's
fully in stride right now."
ONE ANGRY MAN - Antonin Scalia's Decade
William Rehnquist's 10th anniversary as Chief Justice
is also Antonin (Nino) Scalia's 10th anniversary as an
Associate Justice. Nominated to Rehnquist's seat when
Rehnquist was promoted to replace Warren Burger,
Scalia - a four-year veteran of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit -- faced
no opposition. He was confirmed, 98-0, after less than
five minutes of Senate floor discussion.
During Scalia's first few years on the Court,
commentators wondered whether his combination of
intelligence and gregariousness would make him into
the Rehnquist Court's real intellectual leader. As
Laurence H. Tribe, a Harvard law professor, told The
Boston Globe in 1990: "There is no question Scalia is
brilliant. What remains to be seen is if he is wise."
Six years later, the verdict is all but unanimous:
Scalia is rash, impulsive and imprudent, a Justice who
in case after case would rather insult his colleagues'
intelligence than appeal to them. Judge Alex Kozinski,
a conservative member of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, pronounced his judgment
as early as 1992: "Commentators said, 'This is the guy
who, through his charm and intellect, will forge a
conservative consensus.' He hasn't done it." The New
Republic's Jeffrey Rosen, contending that Scalia "has
intellectual contempt for most of his colleagues,"
suggests that the relatively young Justice -- Scalia is
now 60 -- calls to mind the sad career of another
brilliant judicial failure, Felix Frankfurter.
One former Scalia clerk insists that the Justice is "100
percent impervious" to public criticism. But Scalia is
hardly ignorant of his bad-boy reputation; three years
ago, he insisted to one Washington audience that "I am
not a nut." In comments to the Supreme Court
Historical Society, Scalia observed that dissenting
opinions "do not, or at least need not, produce
animosity and bitterness among the members of the
Court." But even more revealing was a statement
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor made to a Ninth Circuit
judicial conference. Reminding her audience of the old
saying that "sticks and stones will break my bones but
words will never hurt me," O'Connor added, "That
probably isn't true."
A colleague confirms that O'Connor has been "deeply
wounded" by the insults Scalia has sent her way,
starting in 1989 in the abortion case Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services. O'Connor's analysis,
Scalia wrote there, "cannot be taken seriously."
A former Scalia clerk acknowledges that Scalia
"completely alienated" O'Connor and "lost her forever,"
and a former Rehnquist clerk notes how O'Connor's
"personality is in many ways just the opposite of Justice
Scalia's. She's very willing to build consensus on
opinions." But Scalia, says another ex-clerk, is not only
"in love with his own language," he also believes that
"what he's doing is a matter of principle. He knows how
right he is."
On the next-to-last day of the 1995-1996 term, Scalia
turned his rhetorical guns on Rehnquist, who had
committed the grievous sin of concurring with the
Court's 7-1 majority in striking down the Virginia
Military Institute's exclusion of women from a state
institution. In his lonely, splenetic dissent, Scalia called
the majority's equal protection analysis "irresponsible"
and mocked Rehnquist's separate views as 'more
moderate than the Court's but only at the expense of
being even more implausible." Saying Rehnquist
erroneously suggested that Virginia "should have
known. . what this Court expected of it" because of an
earlier Court ruling, Scalia truculently asserted that
"any lawyer who gave that advice to the
Commonwealth ought to have been either disbarred or
committed."
Scalia's characterization of the Chief Justice's views
represented the first time in memory that one member
of the Court had suggested that another might be better
situated in a nonjudicial institution, but virtually
nothing that Scalia might say could worsen the
reputation he has made for himself among students of
the Court. Harvard's Laurence Tribe decries Scalia's
"extreme stridency and disrespect for opposing views."
Another well-known law professor, far less liberal than
Tribe and a social colleague of several Justices, ruefully
looks back on the Senate's 1987 rejection of Supreme
Court nominee Robert H. Bork and concludes that Bork
would have been "more civil and more broad-minded
than Scalia by a long shot." Indeed, Scalia, he contends,
"has become precisely what the Bork opponents thought
Bork would be."
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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NO CONTEST: TOP COURT'S TOP FIGHTER IS SCALIA
Chicago Tribune
Tuesday, May 27, 1997
Glen Elsasser, Washington Bureau.
The nine justices of the Supreme Court will pass
through the draped pillars on cue Tuesday,
predictably sober-faced as they take seats on the
highest court in the land.
But the business-as-usual tempo will quickly change
with oral arguments on whether Congress abused its
power by giving President Clinton a line-item veto of
spending bills.
Dominating the court's final hearing until fall will
almost surely be Antonin Scalia, a theatrically
engaging conservative, former University of Chicago
Law School professor, poker-playing, opera-loving
subject of an adoring Web site and father of nine.
With a distinctly aggressive style--at turns
provocative, testy and witty--the only justice who
wears a beard will be totally at ease, once again the
garrulous gadfly in a world where quarrels are
reduced to footnotes and caution and understatement
dominate.
Court policy denies cameras even a peek at Supreme
Court proceedings, but not for a generation have
these hearings been so lively. Much of it has to do
with the presence of Scalia, a serial questioner of
sorts who relishes the high-stakes oral arguments.
Indeed, since his 1986 selection to the court by
President Ronald Reagan, the controversial Scalia
has evolved into the court's most outspoken and
high-profile member, even inspiring fringe support of
late from ardent conservatives as a potential
presidential candidate in 2000.
A former academic at the University of Virginia,
assistant U.S. attorney general and a lawyer for a
large Cleveland law firm, Scalia thrives on the
exchange of ideas. Named to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1982, Scalia
found it easier to communicate with colleagues there
than on the nine-member high court.
In fact, he laments the lack of lively exchanges
among the justices in their private conferences,
which reflect the streamlined, sober managerial style
of Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
"At oral arguments he is able to let down his guard
much more than he usually does around the court,"
said a former clerk. "He uses arguments as a
conversational tool to explore the intricacies of a case
for himself and his colleagues."
In his chambers, Scalia, 60, has institutionalized an
annual practice of hiring a "counterclerk" whose
liberal views are at odds with his own and those of
the other three clerks. He listens carefully to what the
clerk has to say as a check on his natural
inclinations.
He can dominate oral arguments and is expected to
turn his intellectual shredder loose on the line-item
veto, which opponents charge disrupts the delicate
balance of power between Congress and the
presidency.
It was much the same during recent arguments on
protecting children from Internet indecency. Scalia
confessed that he junks his computer every five years,
his way of commenting on the court's difficulty in
keeping abreast of technology without trampling free
speech rights. He also spoke, tongue-in-cheek, about
a possible exemption from prosecution for teenagers
who swap sexual exploits on the Internet.
Vintage Scalia also flowed at the recent hearing on
allowing public school teachers to return to parochial
schools to teach remedial classes. In 1985 the court
outlawed the 20-year-old federally funded program
because of its potential for advancing the schools'
religious mission.
New York City parents and officials now seek a
reversal of the ruling, contending it no longer reflects
the court's current thinking. They also charge that the
alternatives, especially teaching the remedial classes
in mobile vans, are too costly and disruptive.
"I assume the state can provide buses to those
parochial school students?" Scalia asked New York
attorney Stanley Geller, who represents those
opposed to any change in the 1985 decision.
Before Geller could finish his sentence, Scalia
hurled another volley: Could parochial schools be
provided fire protection and other public services?
Geller barely had time to utter "yes" when Justice
Anthony Kennedy picked up Scalia's inquiry. "Isn't
that true, even if that advances the mission of the
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parochial school?" Kennedy asked.
Geller sent Scalia off in a new direction by saying
there was no way to prevent public school teachers
from teaching religion in parochial school
classrooms.
If you have this problem with teachers promoting
religious values, Scalia said, why couldn't it happen
in a van as well as a classroom? Would it be easier to
bug the vans as a safeguard than the classrooms?
"Somehow when the teacher walks into a parochial
school classroom," Scalia observed sarcastically, "she
is magically transformed from an impartial employee
of the state into somebody who is going to teach
religion."
It seems unlikely that Scalia will become a national
political candidate, but John McGinnis, who teaches
at New York's Cardozo Law School, in a December
article in the conservative National Review magazine
described Scalia as "the model candidate" for a
presidential run.
A former Justice Department official in the Reagan
and Bush administrations, McGinnis contends that
Scalia's skills as "a courtroom debater" could raise
the level of presidential politics above "the low
denominator of the sound bite."
Meanwhile, since last November, John Schwenkler,
a law student at Michigan State University, has
posted a site on the Internet dedicated to the "Cult of
Scalia." The site proclaims:
"Overcome by unadulterated awe, we, the votaries
of perhaps the greatest jurist of our times, have taken
wholeheartedly to the Net, that he might be more
widely known and appreciated."
Schwenkler admits that his Internet introduction to
the justice--whom he had met on a student trip--was
probably too effusive. Still, he says, Scalia is "a hard
person to be blase about."
Since joining the nation's highest court, Scalia has
pursued what he insists is an "originalist" path that
relies on the Constitution's actual text in
decision-making.
"He is the justice who works the hardest to construct
a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation that
does not change from case to case," said Douglas
Kmiec, a Notre Dame law professor.
In his new book "Justice Antonin Scalia and the
Conservative Revival," Richard Brisbin describes
Scalia as "the leading preacher of the conservative
revival that is rapidly becoming the creed of the
political majority."
"He is concerned about Congress' habit of writing
imprecise legislation that leaves its interpretation and
application in the hands of bureaucrats," said Brisbin,
who teaches political science at West Virginia
University.
Nonetheless, Brisbin continued, Scalia supports a
strong federal government, unlike Chief Justice
Rehnquist or Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, both
consistent supporters of states' rights, and numerous
other anti-Washington conservatives.
Since the early 1980s, Scalia, the only son of an
Italian-born language professor and a schoolteacher,
has been an outspoken opponent of affirmative action
or preferential treatment to correct past
discrimination.
As Brisbin puts it, Scalia believes that "a general
lack of race consciousness by government" would go
a long way to cure racism. Scalia put it more bluntly
in a 1995 opinion: "Under the Constitution there can
be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor race.
. . in the eyes of the government, we are just one race
here. It is American."
In rejecting any constitutional basis for abortion
rights, Scalia is a minority voice on the court. Like
all the current justices, he sees no constitutional
barrier to the death penalty.
Although he voted with the slim five-justice
majority to uphold the rights of flag-burners in 1989
and 1990, Brisbin observed that Scalia's reading of
the Ist Amendment generally benefits "political
interests he would support" such as abortion
protesters and prayer at public school graduations.
On these issues he often casts a dissenting vote.
Scalia's "strident style" of dissent discourages
compromise and coalition-building on a collegial
court, said Christopher Smith, a Michigan State
University political scientist.
The author of "Justice Antonin Scalia and the
Supreme Court's Conservative Moment," Smith
observed that "Scalia is not much of a diplomat and
ends up condemning everybody who disagrees with
him."
For example, in one recent dissent Scalia accused
the majority of producing "a bizarre arrangement that
will have troublesome consequences" and making "a
destructive inroad on I" Amendment law."
Smith contends that Scalia's conservative moment
may have passed. Overturning landmark decisions
such as Roe vs. Wade or Engel vs. Vitale, rulings
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which established abortion rights and outlawed
public school prayer respectively, is unlikely.
"I think he is one justice who thinks his influence is
not putting together majorities today but influencing
history tomorrow," noted Steven Shapiro, the
national legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union.
"When you tally up the 5-4 decisions at the end of
the year, as (Justice Anthony) Kennedy goes, so goes
the court," Shapiro said. He also pointed out both
"the extraordinary role" O'Connor has played in the
development of constitutional doctrine and the
emerging influence of Justice David Souter.
Commentators invariably mention Scalia's Roman
Catholic background, he was valedictorian at a Jesuit
prep school in Manhattan and Georgetown University
before studying at Harvard University Law School.
He worships at a suburban Virginia parish popular
with conservative Catholics, who erected a
monument to unborn children two years ago as a
symbol to their opposition to abortion. While living
in Chicago's Hyde Park neighborhood, he once
complained to the pastor about the parish becoming
too trendy and "an ecclesiastical playpen."
Outside the courtroom Scalia displays a softer, less
combative side. As the main speaker at a Capitol
ceremony commemorating Holocaust victims, he
acknowledged that "the anti-Semitism of many of my
uncomprehending co-religionists over many centuries
helped set the stage for the mad tragedy" caused by
the Nazis.
Recalling Germany's prewar reputation as one of
world's most educated, progressive and cultured
countries, Scalia reminded his audience of Cardinal
John Henry Newman's admonition: "Knowledge is
one thing, virtue is another; good sense is not
conscience; refinement is not humility."
Regardless of politics, Scalia disarms and charms.
Last week, he ditched the opportunity to make a
formal speech and instead engaged in a frank, hour
long chat with members of the Anti-Defamation
League, a Jewish civil rights group.
He also derided proposals of conservative
Republicans in Congress to impeach liberal judges, a
notion that "shouldn't go anywhere." Asked about
philosophical ally Robert Bork's urging that Congress
override some Supreme Court rulings, Scalia
snapped, "Bork has essentially given up. I'm not
ready to throw in the towel."
A Los Angeles activist asked about the court's
refusal to hear Chicago's highly publicized Baby
Richard custody case.
The justice shied from the usual "no comment" and
said that there had to be respect for the legal
processes already in place. It simply was not the
place of the court to interfere.
Copyright 1997 The Chicago Tribune
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THOMAS INCREASING IN STATURE AS JUSTICE
The Washington Times
Sunday, July 27, 1997
Frank J. Murray
Six terms into his Supreme Court career, Clarence
Thomas is starting to exercise some supreme power.
His toughest opinions now "hold five": They're precise
enough to attract a majority, but not so pointed they
drive off potential allies.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's assignment of
Justice Thomas to several lightning-rod cases in the
1996-97 term, particularly a landmark decision on
whether states may incarcerate sexual predators after
their sentences have been served, demonstrates a
confidence not seen in prior terms and marks the end
of an unofficial apprenticeship.
The need to "hold five," in justice jargon, is absolute
when writing opinions that illuminate the frontiers of
jurisprudence. Justices walk a razor's edge to avoid
driving off a swing vote with superheated rhetoric or
even too much clarity.
At age 49, Justice Thomas has yet to overcome
skepticism fueled by a rival for the bench and by
opponents in the civil rights arena. He never coveted
a Supreme Court seat, but he is determined to make his
tenure worth the fight waged over his nomination.
While his stature rises among colleagues and
lawyers, including some he ruled against, the justice
treats incessant news media ridicule as he does other
heckling: as if he never saw or heard it.
"Every new justice on the court goes on some sort of
probation. Will they get their opinions out on time and
be able to keep the court [majority] they had when they
started?" said Marci A. Hamilton, a lawyer who
argued two major cases this term.
"It seems pretty clear to me now that Thomas does
good work. His research is impeccable. He's willing to
take difficult stances, but he always has strong
evidence behind him from his own historical research,"
said Miss Hamilton, a professor at Yeshiva University's
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Of Justice Thomas' 52 opinions on the high court, six
drew more than two opposing votes, and 28 were
unanimous. He was never assigned a case that split 5-4
until this term, when he announced two of them in five
days.
Justice Thomas had been forced to state his personal
views of the law in dissents or concurring opinions,
much as a young Justice Rehnquist did when he joined
the court in 1972.
The sexual-predator ruling permits states to confine,
for life if necessary, any sex criminal who remains
dangerous after a prison sentence, even if he is not
mentally ill. Those predators must be treated, however,
for a personality disorder or mental abnormality.
Justice Thomas' other 5-4 case explained why the
court denied Virginia murderer Joseph R O'Dell any
benefit from a change in sentencing rules imposed six
years after his execution order was final.
While the initial torrent of harsh criticism has faded,
in part after National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People leader Kweisi Mfume called for a
halt, few media accounts have focused on Justice
Thomas' growing support.
When Richard Carelli of the Associated Press wrote
a 1,400-word fifth-anniversary assessment declaring
the justice "may be America's most politically powerful
black man," many of the 1,550 U.S. newspapers that
received the analysis declined to run it.
Only four newspapers used it among 51 major papers
listed in one computer database: Long Island's
Newsday; the Albany (N.Y.) Times Union; the Rocky
Mountain News in Denver; and the Commercial
Appeal in Memphis, Tenn., which edited out the
paragraph rating the justice's political power.
Many still focus on attacks by former federal Circuit
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham III, whom Twentieth
Century Fund legal scholar Lincoln Caplan calls an
obsessive watchdog of the justice. Some analysts insist
Mr. Higginbotham coveted the nomination to the seat
Thurgood Marshall vacated. Mr. Higginbotham did
not respond to a request for an interview.
Justice Thomas, "more than any other individual,
personifies the rise of black conservatism in America,"
said Stephen F. Smith of the Center for New Black
Leadership, a Higginbotham critic and former law
clerk to Justice Thomas. Mr. Smith said the spread of
Justice Thomas' views in the black community
threatens others seeking to be its leaders.
Justice Thomas' style is to conquer doubters one at a
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time, eye to eye and often with the brand of gallows
humor that lets him jokingly describe as a "tough job
interview" the Senate struggle over his legal
philosophy and Anita Hill's sexual harassment
accusations.
He expects to write a judicial record the same way,
one opinion at a time, and not by speaking through a
news media he distrusts intensely.
Recent humiliations include an Emerge magazine
cover depicting him as a lawn jockey and Ebony
magazine's verdict in May that he is not among the
country's 100 most-influential blacks.
Beverly Coppage, an assistant to Ebony's Executive
Editor Lerone Bennett Jr., said the magazine has never
done a separate article on the justice.
"Just because he's on the Supreme Court doesn't
mean he's influential," she said. "1e doesn't affect the
thinking of many people in the black community. I
can't recall anything he did in the current year."
Houston-based publisher Willie A. Richardson calls
that a mistake.
His magazine, National Minority Politics, now
renamed Headway, ran several commentaries and a
counterattack cover story illustrated with a dignified
pastel portrait of the robed justice.
"I'm not satisfied with the way he's been treated,
portraying him as a handkerchief-head and the cover
with him as a lawn jockey," Mr. Richardson said in an
interview. "Even though you might disagree with
Clarence Thomas' views, he should be given the
respect due a Supreme Court justice, one of nine people
who make major decisions for the nation."
Justice Thomas counts on longevity and strict
adherence to an originalist view of the Constitution to
answer those who bitterly fought his Senate
confirmation. Justice Thomas seems more outgoing
and more anxious to confront lawyers at oral argument
and more often speaks to critical audiences.
That strategy works for some editors and a few legal
scholars. It turned around black law students from
Howard and Catholic universities, who spent hours
talking with him at separate meetings and went away
charmed.
The National Bar Association's magazine reported he
told the law students of conquering his own doubts
after entering Yale Law School with help from a
minority-preference program, a topic of great
sensitivity because he now vehemently opposes
affirmative action.
"It kind of shocked me," said Maurice Foster, the
lawyer who edits the National Bar Association's
magazine. "He said he felt that affirmative action's
time has come and gone."
Catholic University student Mandinema R. Kumbula
said two groups of students, visiting a week apart,
arrived at the court skeptical and left two hours later
pleasantly surprised at a justice who is warm and
approachable.
"They saw a man who doesn't have horns on his head
and got a historic opportunity to just talk. I challenged
them to challenge him, and they found it shocking that
he turned out to be a good guy," Mr. Foster said.
Despite the "silent jurist" myth, Justice Thomas picks
his spots to question lawyers.
L. Chris Butler of Houston, the Shell Oil lawyer on
the losing end of a 9-0 decision in a civil rights case
this term, acknowledged surprise at being peppered
with questions by Justice Thomas about the prospect of
blackballing a worker who complains of
discrimination.
"Your solution for your case is ... the employer says,
'Look, you file a charge against me, and I will see to it
that you will never work in this business again'?"
Justice Thomas asked.
"You're quite correct," Mr. Butler eventually replied,
quoting the law as the majority of appeals courts had
decided it. That is no longer true, thanks to the
unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, who
once led the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
"It was a very real appreciation that in a small
community dominated by one or two employers, an
employer could say you'll never work in this town
again," Mr. Butler said last week. "But it seemed he
still was more of an advocate for the EEOC, which he
once headed, than a dispassionate jurist.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Times
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WILLIAM BRENNAN, 91, DIES; GAVE COURT LIBERAL VISION
The New York Times
July 25, 1997
Linda Creenhouse
Justice William J. Brennan Jr., a towering figure in
modern law who embodied the liberal vision of the
Constitution as an engine of social and political change,
died today, almost exactly seven years after his
retirement from the Supreme Court. He was 91.
Justice Brennan had been in failing health for several
years. He died at a nursing home in Arlington, Va.,
where he was undergoing rehabilitation after falling
and breaking a hip last November.
The Court on which Justice Brennan was a pivotal
force for nearly 34 years was, in many respects, the
Brennan Court, although he never served as Chief
Justice.
He was the author of numerous landmark opinions
and, through his powers of persuasion and force of
intellect, the prime mover behind many others. When
he did not prevail, his voice in dissent was strong.
Named to the Court by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower in 1956, Justice Brennan, the Newark-born
son of Irish immigrants, left a legacy that is visible
everywhere in the law and in American political and
social life. It ranges from the one-person, one-vote
doctrine that ended the established order in the nation's
legislatures, to the decisions that transformed the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee into a weapon
against sex discrimination, to cases that opened the
Federal courthouse doors to penetrating scrutiny of the
quality ofjustice dispensed at the state and local levels.
The Court and the country had changed around him
by the time he retired, after a stroke, at the age of 84 on
July 20, 1990. The change has continued in the
intervening years, and a notably more conservative
Court has modified or overturned several significant
Brennan opinions, most recently, last month, when the
Court overturned a 1985 decision that had barred public
school teachers from giving special remedial classes on
the premises of parochial schools.
But Justice Brennan's vision of the Constitution and
the role of a Federal judge remained unwavering, and
the extent to which his legacy remains intact, indeed
deeply knitted into the fabric of modern law, is striking.
The 1,360 opinions that bore his name, and numerous
others that were marked by his influence, set the
high-water mark of an expansive vision of the
Constitution and of the transformative power of law.
As Justice Brennan described his vision in a 1987
speech, he believed that the Constitution -- particularly
the 14th Amendment's due process clause, which he did
more than anyone else to infuse with modern vitality --
existed to guarantee "the essential dignity and worth of
each individual."
Constitutional interpretation "demands of judges
more than proficiency in logical analysis," he said on
that occasion, an address to the Bar Association of the
City of New York celebrating the Constitution's
bicentennial. "It requires that we be sensitive to the
balance of reason and passion that mark a given age,
and the ways in which that balance leaves its mark on
the everyday exchanges between government and
citizen."
At the White House, President Clinton, who had
awarded Justice Brennan the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, said the Justice's "devotion to the Bill of
Rights inspired millions of Americans, and countless
young law students, including myself."
"He once said the role of the Constitution is the
protection of the dignity of every human being and he
recognized that every individual has fundamental
human rights that government cannot deny," Mr.
Clinton said, "He spent a lifetime upholding those
rights and he offered some of the most enduring
constitutional decisions of this century."
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said, "He played
a major role in shaping American constitutional law."
Justice Brennan's tenure on the Court, spanning eight
Presidential Administrations, was extraordinary in both
length and dimension. Only five Justices in the Court's
history served longer: John Marshall, the fourth Chief
Justice, who died in office after 34 years; Justices
Stephen J. Field and Hugo Black, who both retired after
34 years; the first Justice, John Marshall Harlan, who
died in office shortly before the 34-year mark; and
Justice William 0. Douglas, who retired after a record
36 years. Only Justice Douglas wrote more opinions.
For his first 13 years on the Court, Justice Brennan
served under Chief Justice Earl Warren. Commentators
on the Warren Court, which dramatically expanded the
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role of the Federal courts and the Constitution in
protecting individual liberties, have identified Justice
Brennan as the center of gravity of that Court's liberal
majority, "the catalyst for some of the most significant
decisions during his tenure," in the words of Bernard
Schwartz, a law professor and historian of the Court.
"If we look at Justices in terms of their role in the
decision process," Professor Schwartz wrote in
Judicature Magazine in 1995, Justice Brennan "was
actually the most influential Associate Justice in
Supreme Court history."
The center shifted under Chief Justices Warren E.
Burger and Rehnquist; the liberals lost their majority,
and Justice Brennan became the spokesman for a wing
of the Court that was often outvoted and usually on the
defensive. But while he was frequently in dissent, his
role on the Court transcended that of an embattled
defender of the liberal faith. Term after term, he defied
all apparent odds in his ability to pull together
majorities, albeit often narrow ones, for sustaining or
even advancing the principles that first took root in the
Warren era.
Senior Justice, 'Youngest Thinker'
Justice Brennan's final majority opinion for the Court
was emblematic. Issued June 27, 1990, the last day of
his last term, the opinion in Metro Broadcasting v.
Federal Communications Commission, upheld two
Federal affirmative-action programs aimed at
increasing black ownership of radio and television
stations. It had been widely anticipated that the Court
would declare the programs unconstitutional, but
Justice Brennan managed to find five votes for
upholding them. Five years later, a changed Court
struck down a separate Federal affirmative-action
program and effectively overruled Metro Broadcasting.
To his admirers, the role Justice Brennan assumed in
this last phase of his career on the Court embodied the
best of the American constitutional system. "Justice
Brennan may be the Supreme Court's senior member,
but he is also its youngest thinker," the liberal legal
scholar Charles A. Reich wrote in the Cardozo Law
Review in 1988, when the Justice was 82.
To his detractors, Justice Brennan symbolized all that
was wrong with the "activist judiciary." William
Bradford Reynolds, the top civil rights official in the
Reagan Administration, accused Justice Brennan in
1986 of advocating a "radical egalitarianism" that Mr.
Reynolds called "perhaps the major threat to individual
liberty" in the United States.
But when it came to evaluating Justice Brennan's
significance on the legal landscape, both sides were in
agreement. "There is no individual in this country, on
or off the Court, who has had a more profound and
sustained impact upon public policy in the United States
for the past 27 years," a generally critical article in the
conservative journal National Review said in 1984.
There were few areas of the law that did not feel his
impact. One of his best-known opinions, New York
Times v. Sullivan, reshaped the law of libel. In that
1964 decision, the Court ruled that even when the press
publishes false statements about public officials, the
First Amendment permits no finding of liability unless
the official can show that the statement was deliberately
false or published in reckless disregard of the truth.
The First Amendment requires "breathing space" for
free expression, Justice Brennan wrote, as an element of
"a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."
Twenty-five years later, Justice Brennan had not
wavered in his view of the First Amendment. In Texas
v. Johnson, a 1989 decision that found First
Amendment protection for the act of burning an
American flag as a political protest, Justice Brennan
wrote for the 5-to-4 majority: "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."
But it was his 1970 opinion for the Court in Goldberg
v. Kelly, a case little known to the general public, that
Justice Brennan appeared to cherish above all others.
That decision held that it was a violation of the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of due process of law for a
state to cut off a welfare recipient's benefits without a
hearing.
As a prescription for governmental behavior, the
holding in Goldberg v. Kelly appeared modest enough.
But the opinion proved to be a watershed of
constitutional interpretation, a critical building block in
what came to be known as the due process revolution.
A series of decisions that followed erected a
constitutional shield for the ordinary citizen against the
arbitrary or standardless use of governmental power in
many contexts.
In the 1987 New York speech, which he entitled
"Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law," Justice
Brennan talked about the importance of the simple
requirement that government officials meet a citizen
face-to-face before taking adverse action.
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"Due process asks whether government has treated
someone fairly, whether individual dignity has been
honored, whether the worth of an individual has been
acknowledged," Justice Brennan said. "If due process
values are to be preserved in the bureaucratic state of
the late 20th century, it may be essential that officials
possess passion -- the passion that puts them in touch
with the dreams and disappointments of those with
whom they deal, the passion that understands the pulse
of life beneath the official version of events." His
opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, he said, "can be seen as
injecting passion into a system whose abstract
rationality had led it astray."
Belief in Adapting The Constitution
Justice Brennan was an ardent defender of the view
that the essential meaning of the Constitution was to be
found in the modern age, and not in a search for the
original intentions of its 18th-century framers.
Toward the end of his tenure, that vision placed
Justice Brennan sharply at odds with prevailing views
in the Reagan Administration, whose top legal officials,
principally Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d, believed
that the framers' "original understanding" was the only
legitimate source for constitutional interpretation.
For years, Justice Brennan had refrained from
commenting on current political tides. But in a 1985
speech at Georgetown University, he said that the
constitutional theory of original intent "is little more
than arrogance cloaked as humility."
"We current Justices read the Constitution in the only
way that we can: as 20th-century Americans," he said
in that speech. "The genius of the Constitution rests not
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current
needs."
Integral to Justice Brennan's constitutional vision was
the notion that individuals should have the greatest
access possible to the Federal courts. He wrote the
opinion in a 1963 case, Fay v. Noia, which greatly
expanded the extent to which the Federal courts could
hear habeas corpus petitions challenging state criminal
convictions. That decision has been whittled away, both
by Congressional amendments to the Federal habeas
corpus statute and by subsequent Supreme Court
interpretations of that statute.
One of Justice Brennan's enduring landmark
opinions, the 1962 decisions in Baker v. Carr, which
led directly to the one-person, one-vote reapportionment
cases, was in essence a case concerning access to the
Federal courts. Baker v. Carr held that cases
challenging unequal legislative apportionment could be
heard in Federal court. Prior to that decision, the courts
had labeled such cases "political questions," and refused
to hear them at all.
Chief Justice Warren later called Baker v. Carr "the
most important case that we decided in my time." Rex
E. Lee, who served as Solicitor General in the Reagan
Administration, went further in a 1991 forum
sponsored by the American Bar Association. "As you
look back, Baker perhaps had a greater effect on the
distribution of power within our country than any other
opinion that's ever been handed down," Mr. Lee said.
Justice Brennan's opinion drew a bitter dissent from
Justice Felix Frankfurter, his former professor at
Harvard Law School. Justice Frankfurter once made the
ironic comment, "I always wanted my students to think
for themselves, but Brennan goes too far."
Among many other Brennan opinions that opened the
Federal courthouse doors was Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, in 1971, which for the first time
recognized a right to sue a Government official directly
under the Constitution. Another was Monell v. New
York City Department of Social Services, in 1978,
which opened local governments to suits under a 1871
civil rights statute for violating an individual's
constitutional rights.
Leader in Decisions Expanding Rights
In a series of decisions from 1961 to 1969, Justice
Brennan led the Court in a quiet revolution that made
provisions of the Bill of Rights -- a document that
speaks only of the Federal Government -- applicable to
the states. He wrote only one of the decisions, Malloy v.
Hogan in 1964, which made the Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination applicable to the
states, but he played a behind-the-scenes role in the
other cases.
Justice Brennan joined the Court in the immediate
shadow of the 1954 landmark school desegregation
decision, Brown v. Board of Education. There was still
much work to be done to end the regime of segregation.
Justice Brennan wrote several opinions that were
crucial in carrying out the principles of the Brown
decision, including Keyes v. School District No. 1 of
Denver, which in 1973 applied the Brown ruling to a
Northern school district for the first time.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, a major 1965 ruling that
affirmed the authority of Congress to use the 14th
Amendment as "a positive grant of legislative power,"
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providing a basis for expansive Congressional power
involving civil rights.
He took the lead in applying the 14th Amendment's
equal protection guarantee to strike down official
discrimination on the basis of gender as well as race. In
two opinions in the mid-1970's, Frontiero v. Richardson
and Craig v. Boren, Justice Brennan defined a
heightened level of constitutional scrutiny that laws
making distinctions on the basis of gender would have
to withstand in order to survive a 14th Amendment
challenge.
Later, Justice Brennan was a strong defender of the
use of affirmative-action programs that gave special
opportunities to blacks even at the expense of some
whites. In a 1979 opinion, United Steelworkers v.
Weber, he rejected the argument that a special training
program aimed at helping black workers violated the
rights of white workers under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
"It would be ironic indeed," he wrote in the Weber
case, "if a law triggered by a nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the
lot of those who had been excluded from the American
dream for so long, constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy."
Several years later, the Reagan Administration began
using the courts to try to establish the principle that
only those blacks who had been direct victims of
discrimination should be allowed to benefit from
affirmative-action programs. Justice Brennan mustered
Court majorities that rejected the Administration's
arguments and permitted the continued use of the
affirmative-action concept.
Throughout his tenure, Justice Brennan was a firm
supporter of the constitutional right to free choice on
questions of contraception and abortion. His 1972
opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird established the right of
unmarried people to receive information about birth
control. Justice Brennan wrote that if "the right to
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwanted
governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as whether to bear or beget a child."
As constitutional doctrine, the opinion contributed
significantly to the Court's later abortion decisions.
Justice Brennan also believed that the Constitution
required strict separation of church and state. Asked in
a 1986 interview to name his hardest case, he cited his
concurring opinion in the 1963 Schempp case, one of
the early decisions prohibiting organized prayer in the
public schools.
"In the face of my whole lifelong experience as a
Roman Catholic," he said in the interview, "to say that
prayer was not an appropriate thing in public schools,
that gave me quite a hard time. I struggled." But he
added that at the moment he joined the Court, "I had
settled in my mind that I had an obligation under the
Constitution which could not be influenced by any of
my religious principles."
In 1987 he wrote the majority opinion in Edwards v.
Aguillard, declaring unconstitutional a Louisiana law
that required the teaching of "creation science." The
law was a device to advance the teaching of religious
views, he said, and as such amounted to an
unconstitutional "establishment" of religion. His
opinion explained the reason for his strictly
separationist view.
"Families entrust public schools with the education of
their children," he said, "but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be
used to advance religious views that may conflict with
the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.
Students in such institutions are impressionable and
their attendance is involuntary." Time after time,
Justice Brennan achieved results that defied predictions,
putting together unlikely coalitions or finding
compromises when there appeared little room for
common ground.
Adversaries Treated With Respect
Commentators attributed his success to an unusual
combination of a forceful intellect and personal
magnetism. Perhaps drawing on skills he had learned
early in his career as a labor lawyer, he was an excellent
negotiator who treated his ideological opponents with
respect and who never forgot that adversaries of the
moment could prove to be allies in the next battle.
In a 1981 essay, Abraham D. Sofaer, a former law
clerk of Justice Brennan's who was then a Federal
District judge, wrote, "Justice Brennan's great success
on and off the Court has been achieved because he is an
ebullient, generous, charismatic human being." Judge
Sofaer continued: "My point is not that Justice Brennan
has always been right. Rather, it is that the human
qualities of the man have placed him at a formidable
advantage in any dispute over the wisdom and propriety
of his decisions."
Milton Katz, a Harvard Law School professor and
longtime friend, recalled in a 1981 essay that he once
teased Justice Brennan about some telling points that
Justice Rehnquist had scored in a dissenting opinion.
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Professor Katz said Justice Brennan "grinned in
ungrudging admiration" of his adversary and
exclaimed, "Wasn't Rehnquist good!"
Under the Supreme Court's rules, the Chief Justice
has the right to assign the opinion in any case in which
he is in the majority; when the Chief Justice is in
dissent, the power falls to the senior Justice in the
majority. When the Court was ideologically divided,
that power often fell to Justice Brennan. He assigned
himself a number of major opinions each term and
placed other opinions strategically among his allies.
Always willing to curb his own advocacy a bit to
persuade an indecisive colleague or hold a wavering
majority, he was more committed to winning than to
having the final product reflect every nuance or
preference of his own.
Failed to Persuade On the Death Penalty
One subject on which his powers of persuasion failed
was capital punishment. Justice Brennan believed
strongly that the death penalty was unconstitutional in
all circumstances, a view shared among his colleagues
only by Justice Thurgood Marshall.
Neither he nor Justice Marshall ever reconciled
themselves to the Court's opinions permitting the
continued use of the death penalty. The two men
dissented every time the Court turned down an appeal
from a death-row inmate, an event that occurred with
increasing frequency in Justice Brennan's final years on
the Court. After both Justices had retired, Justice Harry
A. Blackmun adopted the same practice, shortly before
his own retirement in 1994.
Sometimes Justice Brennan dissented at length. More
often he simply noted his dissent, adding that he was
"adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the 8th and 14th Amendments."
He believed that his position would ultimately be
vindicated by a changed political consensus, although
he acknowledged that this was unlikely in his lifetime.
He told an audience at Georgetown University in 1985,
"On this issue, I hope to embody a community striving
for human dignity for all, although perhaps not yet
arrived."
He used one of his last public appearances, in April
1996, to denounce the death penalty as a "barbaric and
inhuman punishment that violates our Constitution."
The statement was read for him by his son, William J.
Brennan III, in a ceremony at the Court marking the
Justice's 90th birthday.
Justice Brennan, who began his judicial career on the
state courts of New Jersey, never lost his interest in
state constitutions and the workings of state judicial
systems. He was an influential figure among state court
judges. An article he wrote in a 1977 issue of the
Harvard Law Review entitled "State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights" urged state supreme
court judges to look to their own state constitutions as
sources of protection for individual rights at a time
when the United States Supreme Court appeared to be
cutting back on such protections.
The article became one of the most frequently cited
law review articles in history, and the results were
apparent in a rapidly growing number of state supreme
court rulings that relied on state constitutions to expand
individual rights.
"This one law review article, almost by itself, created
the renaissance of state constitutionalism," a 1986
appraisal in the John Marshall Law Review concluded.
There was an irony to Justice Brennan's role as a
champion of state constitutions, because as a matter of
Federal constitutional law he strongly opposed efforts,
both on and off the Court, to enhance the powers of the
state vis a vis the national Government.
Achieved Expectations Of His Father
William Joseph Brennan Jr. was born April 25, 1906
in Newark, the second of eight children of William
Brennan and the former Agnes McDermott. His parents
met and married in the United States after immigrating
separately from County Roscommon in Ireland.
His father, a metal polisher and brewery worker in
Ireland, became active in the trade union movement
and in New Jersey Democratic politics. He was a
member of the Essex County Trades and Labor Council
and served as Commissioner of Public Safety in Newark
from 1917 until 1930, when he died at age 57.
"Everything I am, I am because of my father," Justice
Brennan told an interviewer in 1986. Asked whether
his father would be surprised to find him on the
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan replied: "No, he would
have expected it."
William Jr. attended both parochial and public
elementary schools. He graduated from Barringer High
School. In 1928, he graduated with honors from the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the
University of Pennsylvania.
At the age of 21, shortly before graduation, he
married Marjorie Leonard, whom he had met when he
was a sophomore in high school. They had three
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children: William II, a lawyer in Princeton and former
president of the New Jersey Bar Association; Hugh, an
administrator at the United States Department of
Commerce, and Nancy, a museum curator and
administrator in Bermuda.
With his new wife staying behind in New Jersey to
earn money for his tuition, he entered Harvard Law
School and was among the top students in the class
when he graduated in 1931. A scholarship enabled him
to continue his studies after his father died at the end of
his second year in law school. Returning to his home
state to practice law, he was admitted to the New Jersey
bar and began working at one of the state's top law
firms, Pitney, Hardin & Skinner. He was a trial lawyer
specializing in representing management in labor cases.
He joined the Army in 1942 as a major assigned to
the legal division of the Ordnance Department. He won
the Legion of Merit and was discharged with the rank
of colonel. Upon his return to law practice, his firm
changed its name to Pitney, Hardin & Brennan. Mr.
Brennan became one of the better-known lawyers in the
state, not only for his wide-ranging practice but also for
his active involvement in the court reform movement
that replaced New Jersey's antiquated constitution and
legal system with one that was generally considered one
of the country's best.
Although he was enrolled as a Democrat, his public
activities were apolitical. New Jersey's Republican
Governor, Alfred E. Driscoll, asked him to become a
judge on the state's Superior Court in 1949. To the
surprise of nearly all his professional colleagues, Mr.
Brennan gave up his lucrative practice for the
unglamorous life of a local trial judge.
A Republican President, A Democratic Justice
The next year, he was elevated to the Appellate
Division. By 1952, when Governor Driscoll named him
to the state's Supreme Court, he was highly regarded for
the many procedural changes he had made to improve
the flow of cases in the New Jersey courts. He had
become a protege of Arthur Vanderbilt, New Jersey's
Chief Justice, who was a leader in the national effort to
modernize the courts. A speech Justice Brennan gave in
May 1956 to a conference on court congestion and
delay, held in Washington at the Department of Justice,
brought him to the attention of the Eisenhower
Administration.
In September 1956, Attorney General Herbert
Brownell telephoned him to ask him to come to
Washington to see President Eisenhower. The call came
to Justice Brennan's chambers in Red Bank, N.J., late
on a Friday afternoon, and he took an overnight train to
Washington, arriving at about 5:30 Saturday morning.
Justice Brennan later told his biographer, Stephen J.
Wermiel, that he assumed he was being invited to head
a group on court administration, a position he did not
want. He was surprised to find the Attorney General
waiting for him at the station in Washington, and
flabbergasted when Mr. Brownell informed him that
President Eisenhower, a Republican, wanted to name
him to the Supreme Court Justice Sherman Minton had
just announced that he would retire because of poor
health. No Catholic had served on the Court since
Justice Frank Murphy died in 1949, and with the 1956
Presidential election only weeks away, President
Eisenhower's advisers believed that the appointment of
a northeastern Catholic would be beneficial.
"Brennan fulfilled the specific purposes for which he
was chosen," Professor Wermiel wrote in a 1993
account of the nomination. "He was a Democrat, a
Catholic, and a state court judge; he was comparatively
young for a Supreme Court nominee; and he remained
committed to reform efforts to reduce delays and
backlogs in the nation's courts." The 50-year-old state
judge was widely regarded as one of the most
impressive young judges in the country, and the
nomination was hailed in both the popular press and
legal commentaries as an example of nonpartisan merit
selection at its best. Life magazine said the nominee
"brings to the Court one of the keenest, quickest judicial
minds in the country."
Because Congress was in recess, Justice Brennan was
able to take his seat immediately, on Oct. 16, 1956. At
his confirmation hearing, in February 1957, he received
hostile questioning only from Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy of Wisconsin, who cast the only vote
opposing his confirmation.
Although President Eisenhower was widely quoted as
describing his selection of Justice Brennan as one of his
two biggest mistakes -- the other being his nomination
of Earl Warren as Chief Justice -- the evidence that he
actually ever made such a remark is equivocal.
Professor Wermiel said, "It is difficult to see how the
men around President Eisenhower could have missed
Brennan's liberalism."
In any event, the selection process focused on the
politics of the moment and paid scarcely any attention
to his views on constitutional issues. "The inescapable
conclusion is that Eisenhower got precisely the political
result for which he was searching" when he chose
Justice Brennan, Professor Wermiel wrote.
Justice Brennan had several health problems in his
later years. He appeared particularly dispirited in 1979,
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when he told some of his former law clerks that he was
considering retiring. He had recently suffered a small
stroke and undergone surgery for a cancerous tumor on
a vocal cord. His wife had suffered from cancer for
several years.
But he decided to remain on the Court. He nursed his
wife until she died in late 1982. Three months later,
Justice Brennan married Mary Fowler, who had worked
at the Supreme Court for 40 years and had been his
secretary for 26. The marriage appeared to reinvigorate
him. He resumed an active travel schedule and tackled
his work at the Court with renewed energy and
determination. His wife survives him, as do the three
children of his first marriage, as well as seven
grandchildren and a great-grandchild.
The Court said today that Justice Brennan's body
would lie in the Great Hall of the Supreme Court
Building from 10:30 A.M. to 10 P.M. on Monday for
public viewing. The funeral will be on Tuesday at St.
Matthew's Cathedral here with burial at Arlington
National Cemetery.
Justice Brennan had no intention of retiring when the
Court's 1989-90 term ended. He and his wife were on
their way to a Scandinavian cruise shortly after the
Court began its summer recess when he suffered a
second minor stroke. The couple completed the cruise.
But Justice Brennan's doctor then advised him that he
faced the prospect of a major, disabling stroke unless he
retired.
In a public statement he issued with his official
retirement announcement, Justice Brennan said: "It is
my hope that the Court during my years of service has
built a legacy of interpreting the Constitution and
Federal laws to make them responsive to the needs of
the people whom they were intended to benefit and
protect. This legacy can and will withstand the test of
time." To fill Justice Brennan's seat, President George
Bush named David H. Souter, a Federal appeals court
judge from New Hampshire. Despite their considerable
differences in outlook -- Justice Souter is a Republican
of more conservative leanings -- the two men developed
a warm friendship, and Justice Souter has often
expressed deep admiration for his predecessor.
In 1995, Justice Brennan's former law clerks honored
him by endowing the Brennan Center for Justice at New
York University School of Law, a nonpartisan litigation
and research center. At a ceremony at the Court
marking the opening of the Brennan Center, Abner J.
Mikva, a former Federal appeals court judge who was
then the White House counsel, declared that he was
coining a new word, "Brennanist," which he defined as,
"one who influences his colleagues beyond measure."
Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company
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'THE BIGGEST HEART IN THE BUILDING'
The Washington Post
Friday, July 25, 1997
Joan Biskupic
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan Jr. was
remembered yesterday as a bulwark of liberal activism
whose effect on America is so great -- and his personality
so compelling -- that even those who disagreed with his
views said much of his legacy will endure.
Brennan "played a major role in shaping American
constitutional law," said conservative Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist. "He was also a warm-hearted
colleague to those of us who served with him."
"He had the biggest heart of anyone in the building," said
Thurgood Marshall Jr., son of the late justice. "Justice
Brennan was not just my father's closest and dearest
partner but his hero in the pursuit of equality and justice."
Marshall, President Clinton's Cabinet secretary, said his
father and Brennan could not have been more different as
people, given the backgrounds from which they emerged.
"But they both believed fervently in the very same ideals."
News of Brennan's death, coming shortly after noon
yesterday, spread quickly among former colleagues and
friends. He was known for the force of his opinions --
more than 1,000 -- that embodied the notion that the
federal courts should actively seek to right society's
wrongs. He was venerated yesterday for his persuasive
approach and good humor, and for a charisma that will
help him be remembered for generations.
"There are few people who are truly extraordinary and
we don't always know the reasons why they rise above the
rest of us. But he did," U.S. appeals court judge Richard
S. Arnold of Little Rock, who was a law clerk to Brennan
in 1960, said yesterday. "His chief characteristics were
kindness and love -- to everybody."
Brennan, who retired from the court in 1990 and initially
kept up professional and personal contacts, had been in
poor health in recent months. He died at a nursing home
in Arlington, where he had been rehabilitating after he
broke his hip in November.
A court spokeswoman said Brennan's body would lie in
state from 10:30 a.m. until 10 p.m. Monday at the
Supreme Court Building. His funeral is set for 10 a.m.
Tuesday at St. Mathews Catholic Church in the District.
All quarters of government reacted to word of Brennan's
death. Clinton, who said Brennan's "devotion to the Bill
of Rights inspired millions of Americans and countless
young law students, including myself," ordered flags
flown at half-staff at government buildings, military
facilities and U.S. embassies worldwide.
In addition to Rehnquist, three other of Brennan's
former court colleagues issued statements of admiration
yesterday.
Justice John Paul Stevens, who sat with Brennan for 15
years and shared some of his liberal views, said, "The
blend of wisdom, humor, love and learning that Justice
Brennan shared with his colleagues -- indeed with all
those privileged to know him -- was truly unique. He was
a great man and a warm friend."
"Justice Brennan's death means the passing of an era in
the history of the Supreme Court," Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor said. "In addition to the remarkable legal
legacy he left behind, he left a legacy of friendship and
good will wherever he went."
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said, "Justice Brennan was
one of the great friends of freedom, freedom for those
who have it and freedom for those who yet must seek it."
Justice Antonin Scalia, who strongly disagreed with
Brennan's liberal approach, nonetheless once called
Brennan "probably the most influential justice of the
century" and "the intellectual leader of the movement that
really changed, fundamentally, the court's approach
toward the Constitution."
Joshua E. Rosenkranz, a 1987-88 clerk who is now
executive director of the Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University, said, "I would be willing to bet that
there is not a single person in our nation who hasn't been
touched by Justice Brennan's legacy, whether they know
it or not."
Attorney General Janet Reno said she was sad to hear
Brennan had died and added: "Justice Brennan stood up
for people who had no choice. He devoted his long, rich
life to helping the American justice system live up to its
ideals. He made a difference, and he will be remembered
always by all Americans who prize the rule of law."
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